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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The

Court

of Appeals

has

jurisdiction

over

this

matter

pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated (as amended, 1992) as an
Appeal from final Orders granting a Petition for Modification of a
Divorce Decree in the Third Judicial District Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should the Findings of Fact relative to a "change in

circumstances" and "the best interests of the children" be set aside as
not reflecting the weight of evidence or a mistake having been made.
The Findings of Fact will be set aside only

if they are clearly

erroneous, meaning that they are in conflict with the clear weight of
evidence, or if the Court of Appeals has a "definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made."

Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251

(Utah App. 1989); Haqan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991);
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in concluding

that a change of circumstances occurred and the best interests of the
children would be served by changing permanent custody.

Conclusions of

Law will be reviewed by the Court of Appeals on a correction of error
standard, affording no particular deference to the Trial Court.
v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990).

State

A Trial Court's

decision concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979,

984 (Utah App. 1989); Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App.
1991).
3.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by Ordering

Carolyne Sigg to pay Henry Sigg's attorney's fees regarding the Petition
for

Modification.

A

correction

of
1

error

standard

affording

no

particular deference to the Trial Court is used in reviewing Conclusions
of Law by the Court of Appeals. State v. Bobo, supra*

A Trial Court's

decision concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Myers v. Myers, supra.;

Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra.
4.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by Ordering

Carolyne Sigg to pay Henry Sigg's attorney's fees and related expenses
of a Colorado criminal action.

State v. Bobo, supra.

A Trial Court's

decision concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Myers v. Myers, supra.;

Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra.
5.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by Ordering

Carolyne Sigg to pay all of the custody evaluator's fee. State v. Bobo,
supra.

A Trial Court's decision concerning modification of a Decree of

Divorce will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Myers v.

Myers, supra.; Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra.
6.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by arbitrarily

Ordering Carolyne Sigg to be solely responsible for one-third of her day
care costs and equally dividing the balance between the parties. State
v. Bobo, supra.

A Trial Court's decision concerning modification of a

Decree of Divorce will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Myers v. Myers, supra.; Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra.
7.

Should the Findings of Fact regarding cohabitation be set

aside as not reflecting the weight of evidence or showing a clear
mistake has been made.

The Findings of Fact will be set aside only if

they are clearly erroneous, meaning that they are in conflict with the
clear weight of evidence, or if the Court of Appeals has a "definite and

2

firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

Jense v. Jense, supra.;

Haqan v. Haqan, supra; Crouse v. Crouse, supra.
8.
alimony

in

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by terminating
February,

"cohabitation".

1993,

based

upon

State v. Bobo, supra.

Carolyne

Sigg's

alleged

A Trial Court's decision

concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion.

Myers v. Myers, supra.; Cumminqs v.

Cumminqs, supra.
9.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by not granting

Appellant's Motion to Continue Trial based upon late filing of the
custody evaluation. A Motion to Continue Trial was made June 14, 1994,
(Rec. 633-634) a Motion to Continue Trial and Objection to the Trial
Proceeding was made at Trial and denied (Tr. 4; 78)*.

The Court of

Appeals will review the denial of the Motion on a "prejudicial error"
standard.

Yates v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 887 (Ariz. App. 1978)

* For purposes of this Brief, reference to the abbreviation "Tr." shall
mean the page number of the Transcript of Hearing, June 14-15, 1994, and reference to
the abbreviation "Rec." shall mean the page number of the general record from the Third
District Court.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A Decree of Divorce was entered April 7, 1991, divorcing
Carolyne and Henry Sigg.

(Rec. 356-66; Addendum, Ex. 1 ) . Henry Sigg

filed a Petition for Modification on November 24, 1993. (Rec. 475-89)
On January 12, 1994, Carolyne Sigg filed an Order to Show Cause relating
to Henry Sigg's failure to make required payments under the Decree of
Divorce (Rec. 574-75) which was granted in part by Order dated May 12,
1994, which further reserved the issue of alimony, day care expenses,
travel costs, attorney's fees, and contempt for Trial.

(Rec. 623-25)

On January 19, 1994, Henry Sigg moved for temporary orders pending

3

trial, including appointment of a custody evaluator, which was granted
in part on February 15, 1994, reserving for Trial issues terminating
alimony, contempt and attorney's fees.
conducted Discovery.
June 14, 1994.

(Rec. 579-84)

The parties

On April 24, 1994, the Court scheduled trial for

(Rec. 604-05)

On June 9, 1994, Carolyne Sigg moved to

continue the trial setting based upon not having received the custody
evaluation and Discovery. (Rec. 633-34; Addendum, Ex.2) After a two day
Trial, June 14-15, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young, the Court
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Rec. 671-690; Addendum,
Ex.3) on September

29, 1994 which modified

the Decree of Divorce

transferring custody of the two minor children from Carolyne Sigg to
Henry Sigg, terminating alimony based upon cohabitation, awarding Henry
Sigg $14,000 in attorney's fees for the modification proceeding, $1,000
in attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by Henry Sigg in a
Colorado criminal action, Ordering Carolyne Sigg to pay all of the
custody evaluator's fee in excess of $3,000 and granting Carolyne Sigg's
Order to Show Cause to the extent of a portion of the day care fee. An
amended Decree of Divorce was entered September 29, 1994. (Rec. 693-700;
Addendum, Ex.4)

Notice of Appeal was filed October 26, 1994.
FACTS

1.

Henry and Carolyne Sigg were married September 8, 1984,

at her parent's home in Auckland, New Zealand.
2.

(Tr.238)

The Sigg's daughter Nicola was born March 4, 1985;

Carolyne Sigg has been her primary care taker since birth. (Tr.238-239)
3.

The Sigg's daughter Lindsay was born January 6, 1989;

Carolyne Sigg has been her primary care taker since birth. (Tr. 239)
Three days after Lindsay's birth, Henry Sigg left on a ten (10) day
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river trip. (Tr.240)

Since the parties final separation in July, 1990,

Carolyne Sigg has been Lindsay and Nicola's primary custodial parent.
4.

Henry Sigg physically abused Carolyne Sigg both during

and after their marriage and separation. (Tr.245)
5.

In January 1991, the Park City Attorney filed assault and

battery charges against Henry Sigg after he attacked his wife. (Tr.246)
6.

Henry Sigg regularly yelled at Carolyne Sigg, used foul

and abusive language both during and after their marriage (Tr.245) and
has threatened Carolyne Sigg on several occasions (Tr.247).
7.

Carolyne

Sigg

has

seen

Henry

Sigg

use

cocaine

and

marijuana (Tr.242) and Henry Sigg has admitted to being a recreational
drug user prior to their divorce. (Tr.243)

Carolyne Sigg believes this

was the primary reason for the divorce. (Tr.244) Henry Sigg denies
currently using drugs (Tr.346).
8.

Carolyne Sigg is and was physically afraid of Henry Sigg

based upon his physical abuse and verbal menacing. (Tr.247)
9.
April 7, 1991.

After a two (2) day trial, the parties were divorced
The Decree of Divorce, (record 356-366; Addendum Ex.1)

awards Carolyne Sigg permanent custody of the parties' daughters, Nicola
and Lindsay, and in pertinent part states:
"2. The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care,
custody and control of the minor children of the
parties. There shall be reserved in the Defendant
reasonable rights of visitation which will be
consistent with those rights of visitation which
have been exercised by the Defendant during the
pendency of these proceedings, every other weekend,
every Tuesday and Thursday evening, and such other
times as the parties may agree. In the event the
Plaintiff should elect to reside in New Zealand or
elsewhere outside of the state of Utah, the
Defendant shall be entitled to exercise extended
visitation for up to sixty (60) days each year,
which visitation shall take into consideration the
children's school schedules. If the Defendant does

exercise extended visitation because of Plaintiff's
move as herein set out, the Defendant is entitled
to exercise visitation in two separate segments, at
his option.
3.
In the event the Plaintiff does not move
outside the state of Utah, the Defendant shall be
entitled to four weeks of visitation during the
summer for the purpose of exercising vacation. In
the event the Defendant does not exercise vacation
during the summer, the Plaintiff shall have rights
of visitation with the children which
are
reciprocal to those herein reserved in the
Defendant.
If the Defendant does elect to take
vacation
with
the children
during
extended
visitation, he shall not take the children outside
of the United States without the Plaintiff's
consent.
The Plaintiff shall not unreasonably
withhold her consent, and if she does, the matter
may be submitted to the Court for determination.
4. The parties shall freely and openly communicate
regarding actions to be taken in the best interests
of the children. There shall be reserved in the
Defendant the right to receive and review the
schooling and academic records of the children, all
medical and dental records, all social and
religious records of importance.
In those
instances where duplicate records are not provided
by the children's school of medical provider, the
Plaintiff will forward copies of those records to
the Defendant, such as the children's report cards
and parent-teacher conferences and other regularly
scheduled school activities of the children. The
parties shall take no action to interfere in the
enhancement of the other's relationship with the
children, nor any action which may be construed in
any respect as derogatory toward the other parent
in that relationship.
In the accommodation and
exercise of visitation, the parties will take into
the consideration of the children's needs to be in
attendance at activities and shall give close
attention to those activities and facilitate the
children's participation therein.
5. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff $344
per month per child as child support for a total of
$688 per month. Child support will be paid in one
lump sum on or before the 5th day of each month
through the Clerk of the Court.
Child support
shall be paid by the Defendant until such time as
the minor children reach the age of eighteen (18)
or graduate from high school with their normal
graduating class, whichever shall occur later.
6

8. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum
of $500 per month as and for alimony, which alimony
shall terminate as provided by law or upon further
Order of this Court. Alimony is to be paid in one
lump sum on or before the 5th day of each month
through the Clerk of the Court."
10.

After the divorce, Carolyne Sigg resided in Park City

where visitation regularly occurred according to the Decree. (Tr.246247)
11.

The Divorce Decree contemplates that Carolyne Sigg may

return to New Zealand either for a visit or to permanently live, or she
may reside outside of the state, in which case Henry Sigg is granted
"sixty (60) days visitation each year".
12.

Henry Sigg married Amy Wilking, with whom he had an

affair, shortly after the divorce.
13.

In the summer of 1991, Carolyne Sigg listed her home for

sale and informed Henry Sigg she planned eventually to return to New
Zealand. (Tr.247-248)

A large sign was posted in front of her house

indicating that it was for sale.
14.

The home sold in August, 1992. In the weeks immediately

preceding the sale, Carolyne Sigg discussed with Henry Sigg closing
dates for the home sale and informed Henry Sigg that, as soon as the
house was sold, she would travel to Boulder, Colorado, Disneyland, and
then to visit her parents in New Zealand. (Tr.249; 318-320)
was

aware

of where

Carolyne

Sigg's

parents

resided

Henry Sigg

in Auckland,

Australia and had her parents telephone number. (Tr.320)
15.

Henry Sigg testified that Carolyne Sigg never informed

him she was returning to New Zealand with the children after sale of the
home

(Tr.29-30;

175-176)

and

the

first

time

he

discovered

her

whereabouts was by telephoning Vic Haynes in Boulder, Colorado. (Tr.39)
7

A man with whom Carolyne Sigg had stayed 5-6 days prior to travelling to
New Zealand. (Tr. 223-24)
16.

Henry Sigg called Carolyne Sigg at her parent's home in

Auckland, New Zealand within five to fifteen minutes of her initial
arrival. (Tr.39; 250)

Henry Sigg knew of the location of her parent's

home. {Tr.178-179)
17.

According to Carolyne Sigg, she told Henry Sigg that she

would be in New Zealand until New Years 1992, and wanted the children to
get

acquainted

with

her parents and make decisions

about future.

(Tr.250)
18.

Henry Sigg testified that he indicated he would be coming

to New Zealand and Carolyn Sigg replied that he would not be welcome.
(Tr.40)
19.

Carolyn Sigg testified that subsequent to her arrival in

New Zealand, her daughters telephoned Henry Sigg every other week and he
telephoned them on alternative weeks and Nicola and Lindsay often wrote
him letters. (Tr.250-251)

Henry Sigg denies the frequency of the

contact and only admits talking with the daughters two to three times
and receiving letters from them. (Tr.181)
20.

Henry Sigg indicated he would come to New Zealand first

in September, then in October, and finally in November, but never stated
a specific date for his arrival. (Tr.251)

Ms. Sigg recalls discussing

Christmas visitation with Mr. Sigg and discussing other visitation by
telephone with Mr. Sigg.
21.

(Tr.326)

Ms. Sigg resided with her parents for eight (8) weeks

then moved to an apartment approximately 100 yards from her parent's
residence in Auckland, New Zealand. (Tr.252; 321)
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22.

Henry Sigg arrived in New Zealand on November 4, 1992 and

stayed five (5) weeks; the purpose of his trip was to affect visitation
with his children. (Tr.40-41)
23.

When Henry Sigg arrived in New Zealand, Carolyn Sigg was

on a trip with her father. (Tr.252)

Ms. Sigg testified Henry Sigg did

not contact her for visitation with the children but had hired an
attorney prior to leaving the United States who filed a legal action
against her. (Tr.255; 181-182)
24.

Mr. Sigg testified he had to hire a private investigator

to locate Carolyn Sigg and his children since he did not know their
whereabouts after they moved from her parent's home. (Tr.181) Carolyne's
mother told Henry Sigg they moved and left no forwarding address.
25.

Mr. Sigg alleged that he tried to contact Carolyn Sigg

when he arrived but she would not communicate with him; as a result, he
hired

an

attorney

Convention.

attorney
facilitate

to enforce

the Divorce

Decree

under

The

Hague

(Tr.42-43)

26.

As a result of the legal action, Carolyn Sigg hired an

and

subsequently

visitation.

sought

(Tr.253;

assistance

321-324)

from

Carolyn

a

Mediator

Sigg

to

requested

supervised visitation because Henry Sigg had previously threatened to
kidnap the children (Tr.254; 324-325) supervised visitation occurred for
a period of two hours. (Tr.44-45)
27.

No visitation occurred again because Henry Sigg got angry

at Carolyne Sigg while on a second visit and came across the table at
Carolyn Sigg;
28.

the Mediator asked her to leave. (Tr.253,254; 45)
The New

Zealand

Court held

that there had been no

violation of the Utah Divorce Decree by Carolyn Sigg (Tr.44; 183) and on
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the day of the Court hearing, Mr. Sigg voluntarily departed New Zealand
without notice.
29.

Vic Haynes visited Carolyn Sigg in New Zealand around

Christmas. (Tr.3 2 6)
30.
1993; Lindsay

Carolyn Sigg returned to Boulder, Colorado on February 7,
and Nicola called their father on February

10, and

February 14, 1993. Carolyn Sigg provided Henry Sigg with the telephone
number where she and the children could be reached in Boulder, Colorado.
(Tr.255)
31.

Carolyn Sigg stayed at Vic Haynes house for the first two

weeks in Boulder, Colorado, then moved to her own condominium (Tr.256).
Carolyn Sigg g

e Henry Sigg the telephone number and address of her

condominium whei„ she moved.
line

and

she maintained

The only phone in the home was her private
no

telephone

answering

machine, made

no

restrictions on when her children could talk with Henry Sigg and she
occasionally spoke with Henry Sigg.

(Tr.256; 187) Carolyn Sigg resided

in her condominium for six (6) months from the end of February 1993, to
the end of August 1993. (Tr.261)
32.

Regarding Nicola's school activities, during 1993, Mr.

Sigg attended her baseball games, a school event entitled "Hawaii Day"
and a year end concert.

However, Mr. Sigg testified that Carolyn Sigg

did not inform him of his daughter's school activities. (Tr.194-197)
33.

During the spring of 1993, Henry Sigg had the following

visitation with Nicola and Lindsay: March 19-28; April 15-20; and May
28-June 2.

(Tr.92; 257-259) On all three occasions, Henry Sigg returned

the girls late, sometimes up to two (2) days. (Tr.257-258)
34.

Carolyn Sigg testified that Henry Sigg does not notify

her when he is returning the children in an untimely manner. (Tr. 19210

194)

Henry Sigg testified he always calls her if he is returning the

girls late.
35.
sixty-five

During the summer of 1993, Henry Sigg had visitation for

(65) days through August 28, 1993, consistent with the

visitation award contained in paragraph 2 of the Divorce Decree. (Tr.50;
259)
36.

Since April 7, 1991, Henry Sigg has always received

visitation granted by the Decree of Divorce and Carolyn Sigg has not
been in violation of any Court Ordered visitation. (Tr.125; 259)
37.

During the summer of 1993, Henry Sigg arranged a visit

with his family in Cape Cod; he testified that he requested that the
children be returned five (5) days later than his sixty

(60) days

visitation, on August 28, and Carolyn Sigg refused to agree with the
extended visitation. (Tr.49-53) Mr. Sigg further testified he provided
Carolyn Sigg with an itinerary and telephone number where they could be
reached.

He returned

the children

five

(5) days

later than the

scheduled visitation.
38.

Regarding the Cape Cod visit, Carolyn Sigg testified that

Henry Sigg had not told her of the Cape Cod excursion but she had
learned of the trip through her daughter and she had received no request
from

Henry

Sigg

to return

them

late.

(Tr.259-260)

Carolyn

Sigg

testified she received no telephone number or address for the children
in Cape Cod and did not know the children would be returning late until
two to three days after the scheduled visitation; as a result, she
contacted the Boulder Police. (Tr.260; 327-330)
39.

Mr. Sigg testified he has received only sporadic reports

from the children's school in Boulder, Colorado; no notices of parentteacher conferences; and only invoices from medical and dental health
11

care providers, (Tr.31-34)
Lindsay

are

quite

healthy

Carolyn Sigg testified that Nicola and
and

rarely,

if

ever, need

any

medical

assistance. (Tr.276)
40.

In August 1993, prior to the children's return home from

the extended visit with their father, Carolyn Sigg and Vic Haynes
purchased a home together in Boulder, Colorado.
41.

(Tr.261)

The first telephone line they were able to install at

their home was both a private and business line for Carolyn Sigg and Vic
Haynes; as a result, they placed an answering machine which contained a
message.

(Tr.261-262; 35-36; 189-91; 147-148)

A second telephone line

was installed two months later at the beginning of November, 1993.
(Tr.334)
42.

Henry Sigg objected to contacting the children through

the telephone with an answering machine and in January 1994, offered to
pay for a second private line. (Tr.35-36)
43.

Henry Sigg began leaving messages for Carolyn Sigg and

their daughters using foul and abusive language and making a variety of
threats against Carolyn Sigg as follows:
a.

He threatened to sue her;

b.

He threatened to have Vic Haynes charged with child

c.

He threatened to call the mortgage company and tell

molestation;

them that Vic Haynes and Carolyn Sigg had obtained a fraudulent loan;
and
d.

He threatened that Carolyn Sigg and Vic Haynes would

be very sorry. (Tr.262-263)
44.

Henry Sigg would call and leave several messages, hang up

several times and leave messages for his daughters saying that Carolyn
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Sigg was purposely trying to keep them from talking with their father.
(Tr. 264)
45.

In the early fall, Henry Sigg would call "all hours of

the day and night.
(Tr.264)

Henry

Six o'clock in the morning, one o'clock at night."

Sigg admits to foul and abusive

language on the

telephone and would not repeat the language he used on the telephone
while testifying in Court.
46.
her

a

(Tr. 147-148; 189-191)

The children have told their mother that Henry Sigg calls

"bitch", an

"asshole", and

says

that

their

mother

speaks

"bullshit". (Tr.287-289)
47.

As a result of calls at all hours of the day and night,

the abusive language both with the children and with Carolyn Sigg, and
to end Henry Sigg's frustration with calling when no one was home,
Carolyn Sigg set up a schedule for calling Lindsay and Nicola on Monday
and Friday nights and at Henry Sigg's request changed to Monday and
Thursday nights at 7:00 p.m. (Tr.265)
48.

As a result of the telephone threats and verbal abuse,

Vic Haynes filed a Complaint with the Boulder Police Department for
telephone harassment and the Boulder Police contacted the Park City
Police.

(Tr.94)
49.

Carolyn

Sigg testified

that

she tried

to

set up a

Thanksgiving visitation through Henry Sigg's attorney, John Mason, since
Henry Sigg continued to be verbally aggressive. (Tr.265-266)
Friday before Thanksgiving,

On the

1993, Henry Sigg was in Moab for his

business and wanted to pick up the children the following day.

When he

could not get Carolyn Sigg on the telephone, he called every fifteen
minutes leaving messages on the answering machine.
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As a result, Vic

Haynes reinstated the Complaint for telephone harassment charges with
the Boulder Police. (Tr.95)
50.
by letter.

Henry Sigg and Carolyn Sigg set up Christmas visitation
Henry Sigg was requested to pick up the children in a

downtown parking lot on December 20.

When Henry Sigg arrived at the

parking lot he was arrested by the Boulder Police for the telephone
harassment charge and transported to jail where he posted bond. (Tr.5357)

The arrest was made as a result of Vic Haynes supplying the

information to the Boulder Police Department. (Tr.270-271)
51.

As a result, Henry Sigg obtained a lawyer and defended

the telephone harassment charges which cost him One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) (D.Ex"2"), (Tr.57) and the matter was scheduled for trial in
August 1994.
52.

On

November

24, 1993, Henry

Sigg

filed

a Verified

Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree (Rec. 475-489) seeking,
inter

alia, termination

of alimony, change

in custody

based

upon

interference with visitation, or alternatively, a set schedule of
visitation, change in terms of health insurance payment, and attorneys
fees.
53.

As a result of Henry Sigg's Motion, the Court entered a

Temporary Order on February 15, 1994 granting specific visitation and
appointing Elizabeth Stewart to perform a custody evaluation.

(Rec.

579-584)
54.

On June 9, 1994, Carolyne Sigg moved for a Continuance of

Trial on the basis that Elizabeth Stewart had not yet filed her custody
evaluation. (Rec. 633-634; Addendum, Ex.2)
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55.

On June 13, 1994, Elizabeth Stewart filed her custody

evaluation (Rec: Sealed) which was admitted at trial over objections of
Carolyne Sigg's counsel.
56.

The trial of this matter was held June 14 and 15, 1994,

before the Honorable David S. Young.
57.

Carolyne Sigg's counsel moved to continue the trial based

upon having received the custody evaluation the day prior to trial and
an inability to prepare for the expert witness testimony.
79).

(Tr.3-4;78-

Judge Young denied the motion.
58.

At the commencement of the trial, Judge Young made the

following comment:
"I am curious about that last comment. If a parent
has interfered with the right of another parent to
maintain a relationship with the child, even though
that parent may, in his or her own providing of
care for the children, have a relatively good
environment, isn't it in the childrens' best
interest to place the children with the parent who
would see that both parents have a healthy
relationship with the child? (Tr.17)"
59.

At trial, Carolyne Sigg testified that Lindsay was five

(5) years old and that Carolyne Sigg had cared for her, and Nicola, age
nine (9) years, their entire lives.
60.

(Tr.279)

Both Lindsay and Nicola are doing very well in school and

are socially well adjusted.

Carolyn Sigg has a flexible work schedule

and is very involved in the regular school activities of both children.
(Tr.281-84)
61.

Nicola is heavily involved in local sports in Boulder,

Colorado, including baseball and gymnastics, and is involved
cheerleading clinic.
62.

in a

(Tr.284-85)

Regarding the current condition of the children, Dr.

Stewart testified:
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"They're doing very well. They've always done well
in school and they have been well taken care of.
They are well clothed; well dressed.
Mrs. Sigg
takes particular attention to matters of being
polite and tidy and careful in the home.
The teachers of both children, before the divorce
and since the divorce, have reported that Nicola
has always been - that the parents, the home, Mrs.
Sigg and Mr. Sigg, before, now Mrs. Sigg, has done
a good job in following up on homework, the
children, or child, Nicola, comes to school on time
and there are no problems at all." (Tr.115-16)
She further testified:
"The children, all the children involved reported
to be happy." (Tr.117)
63.

Judge Young recognizes that the children are "very very

successful in their own individual mental attitudes, school experience
and adjustments."

(Judge's ruling, June 15, 1994, para. 11; Addendum,

Ex.5)
64.

Dr. Stewart submitted her custody evaluation (Record:

Sealed) and at trial recommended that it would be in the best interests
of the children to change custody from Carolyn Sigg to Henry Sigg based
upon Carolyn Sigg's alleged interference with visitation rights of Henry
Sigg. (Tr.114)
65.

Dr. Stewart submitted her custody eva^ation

(Record:

Sealed) and in testimony recommended change of custody of the parties
two

(2) minor

children

primarily

based

upon

what

she

considered

interference with visitation rights despite recognition of the children
being healthy, happy and doing very well in all respects of their lives
while Carolyn Sigg has been the custodial parent for the prior four (4)
years and the primary caretaker for their entire lives.
66.

(Tr.114)

Prominently, Dr. Stewart attempts to create a new legal

standard for custodial parents requiring that a custodial parent must
16

provide more visitation than is required by the Decree of Divorce and
bear the entire burden of making visitation work otherwise, custody
should be changed.
a.

Elizabeth Stewart recognizes that there has never

been a period of time during which Henry Sigg has not receive^ the sixty
(60) day visitation pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Divorce Decree.
(Tr.124-125)
b.

Elizabeth

Stewart

recognizes

that

her

entire

recommendation is based upon alleged "interference with custody" for a
total of two (2) five (5) month periods out of the forty-eight (48)
months when Carolyn Sigg has been the custodial parent.
c.
aggressive
Stewart's

in

Despite Henry Sigg being foul and abusive and overly

conversations

position

that

with

his

issues

custodial

the

parent,

has

communication/visitation work.

entered

Carolyne

behavior

communication/visitation

67.

(Tr.125-126)

and

burden

Sigg,

makes

that
to

no

Carolyn
be

it

is

Elizabeth

difference
Sigg,

reasonable

to

the

being

the

and

make

(Tr.123)

Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Judge Young

Findings

Addendum, Ex.3)

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law.

(Rec. 671-690;

The Court entered Findings of Fact with respect to the

following issues:
a.

Alimony. The Court found that Carolyne Sigg and Vic

Haynes began cohabitating in February, 1993, terminated alimony and
awarded Henry Sigg a $1,000 credit for overpayment.
b.

Day Care Expenses. Carolyne Sigg testified that day

care expenses for Lindsay and Nicola Sigg for 1993 and through April 22,
1994 were a total of Four Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Seven Dollars
($4,277.00).

In awarding the day care expenses the Court stated "Now I
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have no great basis to determine upon which, how much of this should or
should not be allowed, and so I am going to make a decision that onethird (1/3) of the amount is the mother's costs solely and the parties
are to divide the remainder."

(Judge's ruling, June 15, 1994, P.7)

(Rec.677)
c.

Attorneys Fees.

According to Finding of Fact 20,

"Defendant has been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position to
assert his parental rights of visitations due to Plaintiff's actions,
which actions are without excuse or justification" and further "that
Plaintiff's conduct. . .was so extreme in nature that it is appropriate
and

equitable

to

require

Plaintiff

to

bear

some

of

Defendant's

attorneys' fees and costs relative to his Petition to Modify."

The

Court awarded attorneys fees and related expenses as follows:
(i)

Campbell, Maack & Sessions - Nine Thousand

Three Hundred Two Dollars and Forty Eight Cents ($9,302.48), which was
supplemented by an additional Five Thousand Dollars

($5,000.00) in

attorneys fees for a total of Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred Two
Dollars and Forty Eight Cents ($14,302.48).

(Rec.748);

(ii) Regarding Henry Sigg's costs and expenses with
his travel to Boulder, Colorado on December 20, 1993, the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) and a vehicle impoundment charge of
Sixty Dollars ($60.00) and attorneys fees charged by Michael Enwall in
relation to representation in the criminal proceeding at the behest and
instant

of

Victor

Haynes

in

the

amount

of

One

Thousand

Dollars

($1,000.00); and
(iii) Expenses of Elizabeth Stewart, Ph.D., for Two
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) for evaluation plus testimony at trial in
the amount of Seven Hundred Dollars ($700.00) plus Three Hundred Thirty
18

Three Dollars and Thirty Four Cents ($333.34) for review of documents.
(Rec.678-79)
The only evidence of financial status of either party in the
record is found in the Child Support Worksheet showing Henry Sigg
grosses $4,333 per month and Carolyne Sigg grosses $2,800 per month.
d.

Custody/Visitation.

While there are twenty four

(24) separate Findings of Fact on the issue, the Court's position is
best illustrated by paragraphs 42 and 47 which respectively state:
42. That the children are closely bonded with each
of their parents with the exception that tension
has been created by Plaintiff because of her
limiting or controlling the children's (sic)
contact with Defendant and further that the
Defendant has made considerable sacrifices to be
close to his children and was even willing to sell
his business and move to their domicile, if
necessary, in order to be with his children.
47. That although Plaintiff has been an attentive
mother who was not neglecting the minor children,
and the minor children were generally doing well in
her custody, it is in the best interests of the
parties' minor children that custody be changed
from Plaintiff to Defendant for the principal
reason,
among
others,
that
Defendant
will
facilitate visitation between Plaintiff and the
minor children whereas Plaintiff has a history of
interfering with Defendant's visitation with the
minor children." (Rec.683-84)
The only Finding of Fact regarding the issue of stability of
the existing custodial relationship is made by incorporation of Dr.
Stewart's findings.

Paragraph 4 of Dr. Stewart's findings states:

"The general interest and continuing previously
determined custody arrangement where the children
are happy and well adjusted. The children are not
happy with the angry disputes between the parents
and specifically they are not happy with the
restrictions on visitation with their father that
have been imposed upon them.
Lindsay and to a
lesser extent Nicola is not happy with Mr. Haynes
being in their household during the past fifteen
months.
His presence and the problems with
visiting their father and stepmother have become of
19

increasing concern to the children and give them
sad feelings. The custody arrangements seemed to
work well during the first fifteen months after
divorce, but has deteriorated steadily since Mrs.
Sigg departed with the children to New Zealand and
has failed to facilitate visitation with the
children except on her terms which are not in their
best interests."
The stability
Stewart

into

an

issue

issue was simply

relating

to

slanted by Elizabeth

visitation

and

her

idea

of

interference with visitation rights, and there is no indication of the
weight accorded the stability factor by the Court.
68.

Based upon the Findings of Fact, the Court entered its

related Conclusions of Law as follows:
1. That the Plaintiff and Victor Haynes entered
into a cohabitation arrangement as of the end of
February, 1993, and as such, no alimony is due or
payable by Defendant to Plaintiff after the end of
February, 1993.
5. That one-third of the day care expenses incurred
by the Plaintiff of $1,425.00 are her sole
responsibility and that the balance of $2,852.00
shall be assumed and paid by the parties equally.
6. That Plaintiff shall assume and pay the fees
and costs and expenses incurred by the Defendant to
Campbell, Maack & Sessions in the amount of
$9,302.48 through May 31, 1994, and such additional
amounts as the Court may subsequently determine by
affidavit submitted by Defendant's counsel.
7. That Plaintiff shall assume, pay and discharge
the costs and expenses of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart in
the total sum of $3,033.34 by reimbursing Defendant
the amount of $2,683.34.
Plaintiff has already
paid Dr. Stewart the amount of $350.00.
8. That Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant for
costs incurred relative to the Boulder visitation
on December 20, 1993, in the amount of $310.00, and
further that Plaintiff shall pay Defendant's
attorney's fees and costs in the defense of the
criminal action initiated at the behest and
insistence of Victor Haynes in the amount of
$1,000.00.
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12. That there has been a significant change of
circumstances with respect to the custody and
visitation as previously ordered by the Court.
13. That there has been a flagrant disregard of
the rights of Defendant by Plaintiff and no desire
to be flexible, cooperative or supportive.
14.
That the custody of the parties7 minor
children shall be changed from Plaintiff to
Defendant as of July 1, 1994 and Plaintiff shall be
awarded reasonable visitation rights with the
parties' minor children to include at least a
minimum
the
standard
statutory
visitation
schedule."
69.

On September 29, 1994, the Court entered the Amended

Decree of Divorce.

(Rec.693-700; Addendum, Ex.4) (Judge's Ruling, June

15, 1994; Addendum Ex.5)
70.

Prior to the June 14-15, 1994 trial, there was one

Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree filed by Henry Sigg
which resulted in a Stipulated Withdrawal of Petition.

(Rec.471) The

Petition filed in New Zealand resulted in a determination that Carolyne
Sigg had complied with the Court's visitation Order.

Henry Sigg has

received all visitation required by the Decree of Divorce from the date
of entry of the Decree, April 17, 1991 to the date of trial, June 14-15,
1994, and Carolyne Sigg has never been held in contempt for failure to
provide visitation.
concern

Despite his superior earning ability and professed

for his children, Henry Sigg only sporadically paid child

support, as of January, 1994, Henry Sigg had failed to pay child support
since May, 1993. (Tr.289)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
A.
WHERE THE FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING "CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES" AND "BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN" DO NOT INCLUDE
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE THAT HENRY SIGG RECEIVED ALL VISITATION ORDERED BY
THE DIVORCE DECREE, THAT ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION WAS
CONFINED TO TEN (10) OF FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS OF CUSTODY, THAT HENRY
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SIGG'S ABUSIVE ACTIONS AND LANGUAGE PREVENTED FACILITATING VISITATION
AND CONTAIN NO APPROPRIATE FINDING REGARDING STABILITY OF EXISTING
CUSTODY RELATIONSHIP AND WEIGHT GIVEN STABILITY FACTOR BY THE COURT THAT
THE FINDINGS ARE FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
B.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT A
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED BASED UPON INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION
WHERE THE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE IS NOT MATERIAL TO PARENTING SKILLS AND
FUNCTIONING OF THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP AND WHERE INTERFERENCE WITH
VISITATION IS THE PRIMARY AND OVERRIDING FACTOR CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.
THE OTHER FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURT WERE REASONABLY FORESEEABLE AT
THE TIME OF THE DECREE OR INSUBSTANTIAL.
C. WHERE CAROLYNE SIGG HAS SHOWN GOOD PARENTING SKILLS AS A
PRIMARY CARETAKER OF HER DAUGHTER NICOLA AND LINDSAY FOR FIVE AND NINE
YEARS RESPECTIVELY AND DURING FOUR YEARS OF CUSTODY, BOTH CHILDREN ARE
PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY HEALTHY, AND HAPPY AND WELL-ADJUSTED, THE COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS TO
TRANSFER CUSTODY TO HENRY SIGG BASED UPON SHORT TERM DISPUTED
INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION.
II.
A. WHERE HENRY SIGG RECEIVED ALL VISITATION ORDERED BY THE
DECREE, THERE IS NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR AWARDING HENRY SIGG ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND THERE IS NO COMMON LAW BASIS FOR AWARDING HENRY SIGG ATTORNEY'S
FEES IN ABSENCE OF SHOWING NEED AND ABILITY TO PAY, IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION.
B. THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW BASIS FOR AWARDING
HENRY SIGG ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CONNECTION WITH HIS DEFENDING TELEPHONE
HARASSMENT CHARGES IN THE STATE OF COLORADO.
C. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING CAROLYN SIGG
TO PAY ALL OF THE CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATOR'S FEES IN THE ABSENCE OF
SHOWING HENRY SIGG'S NEED OR CAROLYNE SIGG'S ABILITY TO PAY.
III.
WHERE THE COURT ADMITTED THAT IT HAS NO BASIS FOR MAKING THE
DETERMINE, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION REQUIRING CAROLYNE SIGG TO BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE DAY CARE COSTS AND REQUIRING THE
BALANCE TO BE EQUALLY SPLIT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
IV.
A. THE FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING "CO-HABITATION" MISSTATE
AND MISCHARACTERIZED THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AS NOT
REFLECTING THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OR BEING CLEARLY MISTAKEN.
B. WHERE VIC HAYNES MAINTAINED HIS OWN CONDOMINIUM CONTAINING
HIS FURNITURE, CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EFFECTS, AND VIC HAYNES DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE OR SHARE ANY ONGOING EXPENSES OF UTILITIES, MORTGAGE, OR
HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES, AND CAROLYNE SIGG AND VIC HAYNES SHARED NO ASSETS,
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THE COURT ABUSED
FEBRUARY, 1993.

ITS DISCRETION

BY TERMINATING

ALIMONY

EFFECTIVE

JUDGE YOUNG'S FAILURE TO GRANT CAROLINE SIGG'S MOTION TO
CONTINUE THE TRIAL BASED UPON THE CUSTODY EVALUATION HAVING BEEN FILED
ONE DAY PRIOR TO TRIAL WAS CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL IN THAT CAROLYNE SIGG HAD
NOT ADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE FOR A MAJOR ITEM OF EVIDENCE CENTRAL TO THE
CASE.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
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This Brief shall show that the Court's action was a clear
abuse of discretion, inconsistent with Utah case law and not supported
by the facts.
I.
CHANGE OF CUSTODY BASED UPON "INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION"
IS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
A.

Utah Law On Decree Modification Re; Custody.

Utah has adopted a bifurcated procedure which a trial court is
required to follow when considering a Petition for Modification of a
custody award.

In Hoqqe v. Hoqqe, 649 P.2d (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme

Court held:
"In the initial step, the Court will receive
evidence only as to the nature and materiality of
any changes in those circumstances upon which the
earlier award of custody was based. In this step,
the party seeking modification must demonstrate (1)
that since the time of the previous decree, there
have been changes in circumstances upon which the
previous award was based; and (2) that those
changes are sufficiently substantial and material
to justify reopening the question of custody.
In the second step . . . the trial court must
consider the changes in circumstances along with
all other evidence relevant to the welfare or best
interests of the child including the advantage of
stability in custody
arrangements
that will
always weigh against
changes in the party awarded custody." Hoqqe v.
Hoqqe at p. 54.

The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated

the necessity

and

explained the meaning of the threshold requirement of the bifurcated
procedure establishing unequivocal guidelines for trial courts to follow
in custody modification petitions.

In Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608,

610 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
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"In order to meet this threshold requirement, a
party must show, in addition to the existence and
extent of change, that the change is significant in
relation
to the modification sought. The asserted
change
mustf
therefore,
have
some
material
relationship to and substantial affect on parenting
ability or the functioning of the presently
existing custodial relationship. In the absence of
an indication that the change has or will have such
affect, the materiality requirement is not met.
Accordingly, it is not sufficient merely to allege
a change which, although otherwise substantial,
does
not
essentially
effect
the
custodial
relationship.
The
r equ i i ed
s h ow i n g
in, a t e r i a 1 i t y
is
t o be
distinguished
from
the
evidence
that
is
appropriately presented in the second phase of t h e
proceeding which the "best interest" analysis
o c c u r s . T h e materiality requirement is designed t o
help t h e court decide if there is a valid reason t o
reopen t h e question already settled by an earlier
order, while t h e best interests analysis relates t o
a present and future readjustment of t h e p a r t i e s '
interest.
In other w o r d s , if t h e circumstances
that have changed d o not appear on their face t o b e
the kind of circumstances on which an earlier
custody decision w a s based, there i s no valid
reason t o reconsider that decision.
T h e rational
is that custody placements, once m a d e , should be as
stable as possible unless the factual basis for
them has completely changed."
On facts wh i ch are strikingly similar t o t h e case n o w before
the C o u r t , this Coin: t has reversed

a trial court modification

Decree of I)i ^ rorce trai isf erring custod}

of a

11 i Cummings v. Cummi nqs , 82 1

P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1 9 9 1 ) , t h e parties wer e di voiced i n 1980, at which
time

they

had one s o n .

Subsequently,

they

engaged

in pei iods of

r e c o n c i l i a t i o n wh i ch i: esul ted i n the bir th of a second son In 198(J . The
par t:i e: 3 p« n riiai lei i1 .3 \

separated

:i i l

] 986

Tl n sy

sti pill a 1 e d

t ha 1

Cummings should have custody of the parties"'" t w o mi nor children.
1989

Mr

Cummings

D •- -

;e

s e e k i n g j: > e r in a n e n t c u s t o d y of t h e c h i ] d r e n.

Cummings

presented

petitioned

evidence

for a niodif I cation

from

D r . Elizabeth
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Mi i, ,
In

of the Decree of

Stewart

A t t r i a 1, M r .
w h o , after

evaluating

the parties

and their children, testified

opinion, Mr. Cummings should have custody.
evaluation

of

each

person

was

also

incorporated into the court's findings.

that

in her

Dr. Stewart's written

admitted

into

evidence

and

Additionally, the parties 11

year old child testified that he preferred to live with his father but
wished to spend as much time as possible with his mother. After a three
day trial, the Court found a substantial change in circumstances had
occurred and it was in the best interests of the children that custody
be transferred to Mr. Cummings. The Court based its determination of a
change of circumstances upon the following findings: that Ms. Scott had
separate relationships with three different men over the prior three
years; that Mr. Scott (Ms. Cummings'' remarried spouse) imposed rules and
discipline on the children which caused them emotional harm; that Mrs.
Cummings interfered with Mr. Cummings' visitation rights; and that
custody had never been litigated but had been resolved

originally

through stipulation. The court also found that Mrs. Cummings held three
different jobs during the past three years and had been in her current
position for less than one year.

Mrs. Cummings appealed the trial

court's change of custody.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the facts upon which the trial
court based its assessment that a change in circumstances had occurred.
The Court first indicated that although Mrs. Cummings had held three
different jobs in the last three years, it pointed out the trial court
did not state how it adversely affects the children or is relevant to
Mrs.

Cummings' parenting

ability.

Then, the Court

reviewed Mrs.

Cummings' interference with Mr. Cummings' visitation rights stating,
"Again, there is no explanation of how these disputes over visitation
impact

the parenting

ability

of Ms. Scott
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(Mrs. Cummings).

All

.i terent problem, a s s o c i a t e d with t h e
current custody dispute."

T h e trial Cuuil then reviewed IU" Stewart M

t e s t i m o n y findinq that t h e boys iiad suffered emotional, harms d u e to the
.11 s^ "t\ ] i ne in posed by Mi t" Court stated, '"I'neie i s no evidence m
abuse.

In

fad , Lin

record

ummings

-•: * ent h u s b a n d .

]

The

I. 01; psychologica]

estabii^ne^ t

disci pi inlru] the children that Mi, Sco: : .--.;
to tl lei i: inuiiih 11 in 1 in i i 'vu k i in | llieii fi
that t h e r e w a s n o evidence of emotional harm,

- . only

method ol,

sending the children
."

i n e Court c o n c l u d e d

tonally, t h e Court

noted:

"The Court (trial coui t ) did not m a k e factual
findings regarding the circumstances at either of
the two times that the parties stipulated to the
custody arrangement. There is undisputed evidence,
however, that the circumstances now are much the
same as at the time of the second stipulation.
There is no evidence or findings to suggest that
Ms. Scott (Mrs. Cummings) is substantially less
able now to care of the boys and provide them a
stable and loving home than she was when Mr.
Cummings agreed that Ms. Scott (Mrs. Cummings)
should have custody."
Cummings v. Cummings at
p. 477,
In a holding which squarely applies to the facts now before
this Court, the Cummings' court stated:
"In this case, most of the factors contributing to
the change in circumstances cited in the Court's
findings were foreseeable at both the time of the
Decree and the subsequent orders. . . .
We find that even under the Elmer evidentiary
standard, the changes are not sufficient to
constitute a substantial or materi al change of
circumstances."

Cummings at 478.

Concluding the portion of the opinion on custody, the Court
made

it clear that changes in custody after a long standing

relai u Jin-dii |, i die stionglx

dis£a\ 'ored
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especially

i i: i

custodial

i icjhr

<A

T he

petitioner's failure to show a change of circumstance.

The Court

stated:
"If this were an initial custody determination, we
would be much less likely to disturb the trial
court's ruling because of the deference we accord
the trial court to weigh the relative merits of the
two homes, one with differing but not harmful
parenting styles.
However, where, as here, the
trial court reversed a long standing arrangement,
without appropriate consideration of the years
these boys had lived with their mother, we cannot
affirm. We reverse the custody award, rather than
remanding for further proceedings, to minimize
further disruption of the children's or parties'
lives." Cumminqs at 479-80.
In the event the Court determines that there has been a
substantial and material change in circumstances, it may then consider
the "best interests of the child."

In Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54

(Utah App.1990) the Utah Court of Appeals enumerated specific factors
which must be included in determination of the best interests of a child
in a custody dispute.

Those factors include:

"The need for stability in custodial relationships
and environment; maintaining an existing primary
custodial bond; the relative strength of parental
bonds; the relative abilities of the parents to
provide
care,
supervision
and
a
suitable
environment for the children and to meet the needs
of the children; preference of a child able to
evaluate the custody question; the benefits of
keeping siblings together, enabling siblings bonds
to form; the character and emotional stability of
the custodian; and the desire for custody, the
apparent commitment of the proposed custodian to
parent. Moon v. Moon at 54.
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court,
"If an existing custody arrangement is not inimical
to the child, the continuity and stability of the
arrangement
are
factors
to
be
weighed
in
determining a child's best interests.
What
particular way to be accorded those factors in a
given case must depend upon the duration of the
initial custody arrangement, the age of the child,
the nature of the relationship that has developed
between the child and the custodial and non28
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compelling"."

•fv Lr-;; ":»: considering

competing claims to custody between fit

parents

• * sts of the child' standard, considerable
should be given to which parent has been the cl
prior to the d i v o r c e ,
B.

weight

. • s pi: i iriary car e gi vei :

Davis v. D a v i s , 749 P.2d * 47, 648 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) .

The Findings of Fact regarding V i s i t a t i o n / C u s t o d y are not

supported by the record and a clear mistake has been m a d e .
The Findings of Fact regarding V i s i t a t i o n / C u s t o d y
R e c . 679-685)
with

are not

visitation

supported

by the record

iiml, iiildit mihjlly,

which are requiied
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regarding

In ,tdr -

(Tr.27-51;
interference
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factors
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Interference

with

Visitation

findings

are

contrary

to

the

Ordered, by

the

f o 1 ] o "w :i n g i 11 i r e b u t t: e d e v :i d e n c e :

Court.

],

Henry

Henry

Si gg

Sigg A l w a y s
always

Received Visitation

received

the

sixty

(60)

days

visitation

o u t l i n e d in p a r a g r a p h 2 of the Deer ee of Divorce both w h i l e
Sigg was

i „ lie:

Zea ] and and

i n the I In i t .ed St .a f es ,

Carolyne

( T r . 44 ; 183; 2 5 9 )

T h e r e w a s no v i o l a t i o n of visitatioi i by Car olyne Siqg at any p o i n t .
Rhet^:;ea_

, * •„ . HF .*- be-^n*-:- \

ci is'
received -

* ..i

•

*

•

,*t legitimately

n visitdLxun

when

Henry

change

Sigg

has

- ^:._.:. w:t :. has been ordered by the C o u r t .

Consistent Verbal Abuse and H a r a s s m e n t ,

The

unrebutted

evidence is that Henry sigg has consistently and relentlessly pursued a
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course of verbal abuse of Carolyne Sigg since the Decree of Divorce was
entered.

The Court and the evaluator make much of the Divorce Decree's

requirement to "openly and freely communicate regarding the children."
However, Henry Sigg's foul and abusive telephone calls both to the
children and to Carolyne Sigg, his several threats and foul name calling
in respect to Carolyne Sigg are not addressed as totally preventing any
"open and free communication".

After listening to telephone messages

and conversations with Henry Sigg, the Boulder City Police filed a
telephone harassment charge against Henry Sigg and issued a warrant for
his arrest. The evaluator, with whom the Court agrees, does not believe
that this type of aggressive verbal behavior when attempting to deal
with visitation is "not detrimental".
3.

(Tr.123)

Length of Time of Alleged Interference.

The unrebutted

evidence shows that the facts presented in support of Carolyne Sigg's
alleged interference with visitation span a total of ten (10) months out
of a total of forty eight (48) months of being the custodial parent.
(Tr.126;257-59)

The initial alleged interference occurred during the

five (5) month period from when Carolyne Sigg left Utah in late August,
1992 for Colorado and New Zealand and returned to Colorado in February,
1993.

The evidence regarding "interference" was vehemently disputed by

Carolyne Sigg and the New Zealand Court determined that no violation of
the Utah Decree occurred.

(Tr.44;183)

The second period, after Henry

Sigg returned the children five (5) days late on August 28, 1993 through
January,

1994.

The abbreviated period of alleged

interference is

clearly contrary to a substantial and material change in circumstances
or a change in custody when balanced against the lengthy custodial
relationship of Carolyne Sigg with the children of four (4) years and
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that of being the primary caretaker of five (5) years for Lindsay and
nine (9 ) y e a i: s f : r N i c o 2 a
4
Trial Court,
Hip

No Required Finding on Stability and Weight Accorded nv
There is no Finding of fact which shows an examination of

? I »il)i [ i L>

rj-ed! ^i.'l |;iy the

i 4 i \ i--vj i custodial

foui

relat ionship

between Carolyne- Sigg and Nicola and Lint-ibr-iy innJ I i"n.j w< icjlit ncrinidt il U)
the Court to the relationship.

While Elizabeth Stewart's Finding ioui,

recited above, relates to stability, it provides nothing more than a
slanted v lew o f v i s i L. 11 J on i s s 11es
6.

Errors in Findings of Fact in the following respect;
a.

Finding

of

Fact

4 3 is

gei'j for visitation
from N e w Zealand

as follows;

{Tr.92;295-97| ,

March

Additionally,

foi

clearly
Henry

19-28; Apiil

Henry

Sigg

was

TP e r t i. in e v i s i t. a I" i o n i;. h r o u g h Angus t 2 8,
spring

and

summer

oi

J 993,

Henry

communication with his daughters*
b.

Sigg

had

erroneous

Siqq

upon

in

her

that

return

lb-20; May 2b-June
accorded
199 3 ,

free

and

his

lengthy

{T r .9 3 )
open

A,

Du r i nq th e

Ltjlephune

(Tr.255-56)

I inding of Fact 4 7 is clearly erroneous regarding ,-„

"history of interference" based upon the un.r ebuLt.ed Li" ts S L J
'l1

Bias of Evaluator, While the Court has the discrete :. :•..

weigh the credibility of the expert witness, i t unfortunately : ;v; : :.: J
the e\raluato: : s i n ifoui ided character attack ai id lead I! risserti

.

wnne

the evaluator ignores, and sometimes justifi es, outrageous behavior by
Henry Sigg, she is qui ck to magnify insignificant minor issues r elati ng
to Carolyne Sigg.

For example, as a resul t of Carolyne Sigg suggesting

to Henry Sigg in a flippant inai n lei: 1:1: la I: Vi c Hayi les shoul ci adopt the
children after Henry Si gg suggested that Vic Haynes pay child support,
she

viewed

Carolyne

as

being

totally
31

insensitive

and

irrational

(Tr.105); that Henry Sigg's name calling and abusive language while
dealing with visitation was not detrimental to arranging visitation
(Tr.123); that despite the fact Henry Sigg consistently brought the
children back late, up to five (5) days, from his visitation, it is
"unreasonable to expect him to change" (Tr.144); discounts the fact that
Henry Sigg's stepmother adamantly believes that Henry Sigg should not be
the custodial parent (Tr.157-58); excuses Henry Sigg's hitting his five
(5) year old daughter (Tr.158); places the entire burden of setting up
and maintaining visitation on Carolyne Sigg. (Tr.110-112;123-25)
Additionally, Elizabeth Stewart sets up a new legal standard
to be followed by custodial parents i.e. that despite having followed
the Court's Order in providing an appropriate length of visitation,
unless a custodial parent provides more than is required by the Court
Order, the custodial parent should lose custody to a more facilitating
ex-spouse. (Tr.110-112;123-25)
C.

The

Findings

of

Fact

fail

to

demonstrate

a

"Substantial and Material change of circumstances".
The record and the Findings of Fact fail to show that there has been a
substantial and material change of circumstances from the time of entry
of the Decree of Divorce to the time of trial, June 14-15, 1994.
In Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that interference with visitation "may be a factor
relevant to the issues of both a change in circumstance and the child's
best interests".

Smith v. Smith at 411.

However, that statement was

made in light of the facts of the case, i.e. the trial court holding
Mrs. Smith in contempt on two occasions for denying visitation rights
continuously over an eight (8) year period.
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circumstances had occurred.
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h^viewing
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a

change
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the Court's Findings of Fact,
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divorce
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j3 e y 0nc j

reasonable

expectations.

Additionally, the most that can be said about the interference issue in
the Findings of Fact is that the arguing on the telephone between Henry
and Carolyne Sigg and discussions regarding visitation created "tension"
in the home which seem quite reasonable in light of Henry Sigg's foul
and abusive telephone calls.

(Finding of Fact 42)

As in Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, there has been no substantial and
material change of circumstances warranting consideration of the "best
interests of the children" or, alternatively, warranting a finding of
change of custody.

The modification of the Decree regarding change in

custody should be reversed based on there having been no substantial and
material change in circumstances.
D.

The Court's determining that it is in the "best interests

of the children" to transfer custody is clear error.
The trial court failed to properly evaluate the factors set
forth in Moon v. Moon 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990) when making the
change in custody.
The overriding factor of maintaining a custodial relationship
which had been in place for four (4) years and a primary caretaking
relationship which had been in place five (5) and nine (9) years, and
which produced healthy, happy, and stable children was given very short
shrift.

In that light, it is difficult to see how the bonding to Henry

Sigg could be anywhere near as significant as the bonding to Carolyne
Sigg, but the Court so found by incorporating Dr. Stewart's finding.
Each of the parents had equal ability to provide care and supervision
since both were working families and preference for a stated parent
should have been given little consideration due to the children's ages.
The character and emotional stability were not clearly considered.

No

mention was made of Henry Sigg's admitted aggressive behavior, corporal
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11 .
THE AWARD O F A T T O R N E Y S FEES A N D EXPERTS FEES IS C O N T R A R Y
TO UTAH JaAW MtLllUNlILLVE.2.
Judge You1" i awarding Henry Sigg over Fourteen Thousand Dollars
($14,000,00)

i n attorneys

Mod i f i c a t i oi i
associated

fees

in connection

with

t h e Petition for

Oi I a Thoi l s and Do3 1 a r s • ( $ ] , 0 ()!),(i f) | 111 a f 111 r n e y s f e e s p 1 u s

fees

i ncur red

b y Henry

Si gg

in

tie tending

the i-olorado

criminal c h a r g e , and oven: Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000,00) in experts
£ees re] ati ng I:c I: I: Ie ser v i ces of E] :i zabeth Stewart is without
or c o m m o n law basis ai id :i s excessi ve and punitive in naline,
message

statutory
The cludi

i s that Judge Young intends t o punish Carolyne Sigg

through

m o n e t a r y m e a s u r e s as we] I as depri ving Carolyne of her c h i l d r e n . T h e
a w a r d o f f e e s t } ] u d g e Y o u i I g :i s irt a d e :i i :i I i 11111 of II HM mil y f I. n a n c i a i
i n f o r m a t i o n regarding both parties i n the record indicating t • - Henrv
Sigg'b

monthly

income

is Four

'Ihousana

Three

Hundred

Thir*. \

Dol±axs ( $4 , 13 T . (J 11 i j rid Carolyne Siqq's monthly income
Eight Hundred imllair

1 \J ( (' DH , Uin

is T w o Thousand

"hi hi S u p u o i t W m k h l i e e l , h

F i n d i n g s ol Fact 53 r Weu.thj) The landings oi I act regarding
fees" d o n o t support t h e various awards of f e e s .
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;hree

"attorneis

(Rec.678-679)

A.

The

award

of

attorneys

fees

on

the

Modification is without statutory or common law basis.

Petition

for

Attorneys fees

in the State of Utah may only be awarded according to a specific
statutory ground or common law principals.

Judge Young abused his

discretion in awarding fees to Henry Sigg in that there is no statutory
or common law basis under which the award of fees could be made.

The

only basis upon which the fees could be awarded are:
1.

Section 30-3-5(7) U.C.A.

Section 30-3-5(7) Utah

Code Annotated states:
"If a Petition for Modification of child custody or
visitation provision of a Court Order is made and
denied, the Court shall order the Petitioner to pay
reasonable fees expended by the prevailing party in
that action, if the Court determines that the
Petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith."
Section 30-3-5(7) Utah Code Ann, is inapplicable to the
fees awarded by the Court in that Henry Sigg did not assert, nor did the
Court find, that "the Petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended

against

in good

faith."

Additionally, the Petition

for

Modification was granted.
2.

Section 30-3-5(8) Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(8)

Utah Code Ann, states:
"If a Petition alleges substantial noncompliance
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent
or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has
been previously granted by the Court, the Court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorneys fees and court costs, incurred by
the prevailing party because of the other party's
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation."

36

There has been no violation by Carolyne Sigg of the
visitation rights granted to Henry Sigg under the Decree of Divorce.
Paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce states:
"The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care,
custody and control of the minor children of the
parties. There shall be reserved in the Defendant
reasonable rights of visitation which will be
consistent with those rights of visitation which
have been exercised by the Defendant during the
pendency of these proceedings, every other weekend,
every Tuesday and Thursday evening, and such other
times as the parties may agree. In the event the
Plaintiff should elect to reside in New Zealand or
elsewhere outside of the state of Utah, the
Defendant shall be entitled to exercise extended
visitation for up to sixty (60) days each year,
which visitation shall take into consideration the
children's school schedules. If the Defendant does
exercise extended visitation because of Plaintiff's
move as herein set out, the Defendant is entitled
to exercise visitation in two separate segments, at
his option."
Henry Sigg has always received the court ordered visitation
under paragraph 2 of Decree since entry of the Decree of Divorce on
April 7, 1991. When Henry Sigg commenced an action in New Zealand, the
Court found that there had been no violation of the Utah Decree.
(Tr.44;183) Carolyne Sigg returned to the state of Colorado in February,
1992, and thereafter, Henry Sigg exercised visitation with Lindsay and
Nicola consistent with paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce.

There has

simply been no violation of the visitation order.
Additionally, there is no Finding of Fact that Carolyne Sigg
has violated paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce which would support
the Court's award.

The Findings of Fact simply state that "Henry Sigg

has been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position to assert his
parental rights of visitation due to Plaintiff's actions." (Finding of
Fact 20); that Henry Sigg has incurred attorneys fees and costs in
enforcing the provisions of the Decree (Finding of Fact 21); and that
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Plaintiff's conduct is extreme and it is appropriate and equitable to
require Plaintiff to bear Defendant's attorneys' fees and costs relative
to the Petition for Modification (Finding of Fact 22).
There is no basis for the Court awarding fees under Section
30-3-5(8) Utah Code Ann.
3.
fees.

Utah common law does not provide a basis for awarding

Under Utah common law, in connection with divorce litigation, an

award of fees may be made only upon a showing of need and ability to
pay.

Kerr v. Kerr 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980); Osquthorpe v. Osquthorpe,

804 P.2d 430 (Utah App. 1990).
The record in this matter discloses that Henry Sigg earns
significantly more money than Carolyne Sigg i.e. Henry's monthly income
is Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Three Dollars

($4,333.00) as

opposed to Carolyne's, which is Two Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars
($2,800.00) per month.

It is apparent that Henry Sigg does not have the

need nor does Carolyne Sigg have the ability to pay the awarded fees.
Despite the disparity in income, Judge Young awarded Henry Sigg these
attorneys fees.
B.

It was an abuse of discretion to do so.

The award of attorneys fees and related costs in the

Colorado action is an abuse of discretion.

Judge Young's award of

attorneys fees in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), travel
costs of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) and vehicle impoundment
costs of Sixty Dollars ($60.00) in connection with Henry Sigg's arrest
on charges of telephone harassment in Boulder, Colorado is a further
indication of Judge Young's intent to punish Carolyne Sigg.

There is

no statutory or common law basis for the award.
The

record

discloses

that

Vic

Haynes,

Carolyne

Sigg's

boyfriend, filed and pursued the telephone harassment charges against
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Henry Sigg. (Tr.94-95; 314-315) The Boulder City, Colorado, authorities
made an independent assessment

finding probable cause to file the

charges and pursued the matter after listening to the tape recordings of
Henry Sigg's messages and language.

Carolyne Sigg is not responsible

for, nor does she have control over, the Boulder City municipality in
bringing these charges or arresting Henry Sigg on December 20, 1993.
The attorneys fees and related costs were simply not incurred by Henry
Sigg on any legitimate basis which would allow Judge Young to award the
fees.

The award of fees is a clear abuse of discretion and should be

reversed.
C.
fees.

Judge Young abused his discretion in awarding experts

The Order requiring Carolyne Sigg to pay the child custody

evaluator's fee is without statutory or common law basis.
Under Utah law, Judge Young could only award the evaluator's
fee based upon need and ability to pay.
P.2d

In Peterson v. Peterson, 818

1305 (Utah App. 1991) Mr. Peterson appealed the Court's Order

requiring him to pay charges for the custody evaluation, polygraph
examination, expert witness fees, service fee and copying charges. The
Court initially held that it was within the Court's sound discretion to
define costs as those reasonable amounts that are reasonably expended to
prosecute or defend a divorce action, and further held, "We also hold
that Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3 empowers a Court to use its sound
discretion in determining whether to award costs based on need and
ability to pay."

Peterson v. Peterson at 1310.

In concluding the

opinion, the Court further stated:
"In light of the fact that the Court knew the
financial situation of both parties and made a
reason judgment based on that information, we
conclude that the Court was within its sound
discretion to award these costs to Ms. Peterson
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based on her need and on Mr. Peterson's ability to
pay." Pe rson v. Peterson at 1311.
First, the record now before the Court shows that Henry Sigg
has a significantly greater ability to pay Elizabeth Stewart's fees than
does Carolyne Sigg.

Second, the record is otherwise void of evidence

regarding the financial conditions of the parties.

As a result, Judge

Young clearly abused his discretion in ordering Carolyne Sigg to pay
Elizabeth Stewart's fees and costs.
III.
THE AWARD OF DAY CARE COSTS WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Judge Young's Order requiring Carolyne Sigg to be solely
responsible for one-third (1/3) of the day care costs and the parties
thereafter to be responsible for one half (h)

of the day care costs is

arbitrary and capricious and not based upon any evidence in the record.
The sole evidence in the record regarding costs incurred by
Carolyne Sigg for day care of Lindsay and Nicola during 1993 and 1994 is
based

upon

Carolyne

Sigg's

testimony.

(Tr.306-07)

Carolyne

Sigg

testified that her job required that she work at home and that she was
not able to effectively pursue her work, especially on the telephone,
while her daughters were present. As a result, it was necessary for her
to obtain day care, primarily for Lindsay, while she performed her job.
None of Carolyne Sigg's testimony was rebutted.

In relation to the day

care costs, the Court found as follows:
"The Court finds as to the day care costs that the
day care costs were not all incurred as a
legitimate cost of day care for the caring for the
children while the mother was otherwise working,
that many of the decisions in relation to the day
care costs were really not necessary even though I
recognize that she could not work as fully out of a
home with the child present as she might be engaged
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without the child being present. Now I have no
great basis to determine on which, how much of this
should or should not be allowed, and so I am going
to make a decision that one third of the amount is
to be the mother's cost solely and the parties are
to divide the remainder." (Judge's Ruling, April
15, 1995 at 6-7; Addendum, Ex.5)
There is simply no evidence in the record or rational formula
available which would allow Judge Young to require Carolyne Sigg to be
solely responsible for one third (1/3) of the day care costs while
awarding

the balance

to be paid

discretion in entering the award.

equally.

The Court

abused

its

The total costs for day care of Four

Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Seven Dollars ($4,277.00) for the years
1993 and 1994 should be equally split between the parties.
IV.
EARLY TERMINATION OF ALIMONY BASED UPON COHABITATION
IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
Judge Young's ruling that payment of alimony by Henry Sigg to
Carolyne Sigg should terminate as of February, 1993, is not supported by
the record and is contrary to Utah law.
A.

The Findings of Fact on Cohabitation are contrary to the

weight of evidence.
Mr. Sigg has misrepresented and mischaracterized

Carolyne

Sigg's testimony on the issue of cohabitation, which is contained at
pages 223-224 and 326 of the transcript of hearing. Henry Sigg repeated
his daughter Nicola's statement regarding furniture at pages 212 - 216
of the transcript.

As a result of the confined nature of Carolyne

Sigg's testimony on the issue, "marshalling the evidence" is the same as
accurately stating the evidence from the record and correcting Mr.
Sigg's very apparent misstatements contained in Findings of Fact 5, 6,
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7, 9, 10 and 12 at pages 4 and 5 of the Findings.

Carolyne Sigg's

testimony is:
Carolyne Sigg left Park City on August 20, 1992 and drove to
Boulder, Colorado, where she stayed with Vic Haynes and the children for
five (5) to six (6) days at his home at 3734 Cripple Creek Trail, prior
to going to Disneyland and Auckland, New Zealand.

(Tr.223-24)

this time she slept with him and had intercourse.

(Tr.226)

leaving

and

Park

City, Carolyne

sold

her

furniture

During

Prior to

placed

small

household items in storage, none of which were moved to Haynes house.
(Tr.227)

When Ms. Sigg returned from New Zealand in February 1992, she

stayed with Vic Haynes at his home for two (2) weeks, where she and the
girls ate, slept, and maintained their wearing apparel brought from
Australia; only food expenses were shared; and Carolyne and Vic Haynes
had intercourse.

(Tr.229)

At the end of two weeks, Carolyne and the

children moved to a condominium two blocks away at the address of 3003
Redstone Lane (Tr.229) which she leased for six months through the end
of August 1993.
together.

(Tr.230)

(Tr.230)

In August, she and Haynes purchased a home

Carolyne Sigg purchased all the furniture for her

condominium; Haynes lent her a couch to use.
shared meals with her.

(Tr.231)

Haynes often

(Tr.231) Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes often saw each

other; Mr. Haynes slept at her condominium from time to time and on
those occasions they had intercourse.

(Tr.232)

Mr. Haynes never

assisted Carolyne Sigg in expenses; however, occasionally he contributed
expenses for food or brought in food.

(Tr.232) Mr. Haynes from time to

time parked his car at Carolyne Sigg's and had free access to the house
and access to a key to the house, which was kept outside.

(Tr.233) Mr.

Haynes never maintained clothes at Carolyne's residence but he kept his
clothes at his own residence two blocks away.
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(Tr.233-34)

Mr. Haynes

did not conduct business out of her condominium.

(Tr.234)

Vic Haynes

visited Carolyne Sigg and the girls in New Zealand during Christmas.
(Tr.326)

According to Henry Sigg, his daughter Nicola said "Nicky just

had told me that because we were wondering if Carolyne and Vic are
together, Nicky had told me that the TV and all the good stuff was in
one apartment

and that Vic basically, essentially

childrens' mother every night."
When viewed

slept with the

(Tr.213)

in a light most favorable to Mr. Sigg, key

portions of Findings of Fact 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 are significantly
inaccurate and contrary to the clear weight of evidence and should be
set aside or replaced with the accurate immediately preceding Statement
of Fact.
B.

Under Utah law, Carolyne Sigg did not "cohabitate".

Either under the accurate Statement of Fact set forth above,
or under the mischaracterized Statement of Facts regarding cohabitation,
Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes did not "cohabitate" or "reside" together
as the latter term is defined for purposes of terminating alimony.
Section 30-3-5(6) Utah Code Ann.
The Findings of Fact do not meet the threshold requirement
established by the Utah Supreme Court that parties must maintain "common
residency" in order to terminate alimony.

In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d

669 (Utah 1985), the Court stated that there are two (2) key elements to
determining

cohabitation:

common

residency

and

sexual

contact

evidencing a conjugal association; "common residency" means "the sharing
of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile
for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Haddow v. Haddow at
672.

Reviewing the facts regarding common residency, the Court found

that a Mr. Hudson spent a substantial amount of time at the appellant's
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(Mrs. Haddow's) home but questioned the court's not finding that Mr.
Hudson was at the appellant's home when she was not there or had a key.
This was particularly significant in that they stated "a resident will
come and go as he pleases in his own home, while a visitor, however
regular and frequent, will schedule his visits to coincide with the
presence of the person he is visiting." Haddow v. Haddow at 673. There
was testimony that Mr. Hudson did not move any furniture into the home
or keep any personal items there except, toiletry articles, and a few
items of clothing that appellant had laundered or dry cleaned and one
picture album.

However the Court noted there was no significance to

these personal effects. The Court also considered significant the issue
of shared living expenses.

They found it significant that the parties

did not share any financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of
the household or share any assets.
contribute

to mortgage

In particular, Mr. Hudson did not

payments, insurance

or

occasionally paid appellant for purchasing food.

utility

bills, but

The Court held:

"It is therefore our opinion that common residency
elements of cohabitation has not been established."
Haddow v. Haddow at p. 674.
The Court quoted with approval In re the marriage of Gibson,
320 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1982) as follows:
"The time Petitioner's boyfriend spent in the
dwelling was extensive, easily sufficient to
qualify as residence if time alone controlled. But
the time was not spent as a resident.
He
maintained a separate residence and shared none of
the expenses of this one. He did not even have a
key or freedom to enter it except when Petitioner
was present.
In simple terms he did not live
there."
Additionally, under Utah law, Carolyne Sigg's staying with Vic
Haynes five to six (5-6) days prior to going to New Zealand in August
1992, and when returning from New Zealand, for two (2) weeks in February
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1993, does not qualify as "cohabitation" or residing with Mr. Haynes
under Utah law.

Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1980).

The Court failed to follow settled Utah law by determining
that Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes began cohabiting in February 1993
while

Carolyne

addresses.

Sigg

and

Vic

Haynes

resided

at

two

(2)

separate

Alimony should not have been terminated until the end of

August 1993, when Vic Haynes and Carolyne Sigg purchased a home together
and moved in.

Alimony should be reinstated through the end of August,

1993, at the rate of $500 per month under the Divorce Decree.
V.
FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL BASED UPON APPROPRIATE MOTION
WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Judge Young's failure to grant Carolyne Sigg's written Motion
to continue the trial filed prior to trial based upon failure to receive
and be able to adequately prepare for Elizabeth Stewart's custody
evaluation, which was again orally made at trial, was prejudicial error.
The central issue of the Petition for Modification was child custody.
It is clear from the record that much of Judge Young's decision was
based upon the custody evaluation.

Where it is clear that a party does

not have access to expert testimony which is critical to the central
issues of the litigation, it is prejudicial error not to continue the
trial until a party has adequate time to prepare for the evidence.
Yates v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 887 (Ariz. App. 1978).
CONCLUSION
Judge Young has emotionally and financially punished Carolyne
Sigg by transferring custody of her two minor daughters to Henry Sigg
and ordering her to pay excessive amounts of fees solely on the basis of
the oral testimony of Henry Sigg
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(all of which was disputed) that

Carolyne Sigg interfered with visitation for a period of ten (10) months
out of forty-eight

(48) months of Carolyne Sigg's custody.

It is

undisputed that prior to leaving the State of Utah in August, 1991,
Henry Sigg exercised Court Ordered visitation.

After Carolyne Sigg

moved from the State of Utah, Henry Sigg always received sixty (60) days
per year visitation as stated in paragraph 2 of the Decree.
or

permanent

move

outside

of the

State, or

specifically addressed in the Divorce Decree.

to New

Zealand, was

The New Zealand Court

found no violation of the Utah Divorce Decree.
visitation

Henry Sigg received

on three separate occasions in the spring of

exercised full visitation through August, 1993.

Temporary

1993 and

Henry Sigg's foul and

abusive telephone messages and language and overly aggressive behavior
when dealing with Carolyne Sigg on visitation made it impossible for
"open and free communication", which Henry Sigg now tries to turn to his
own advantage by alleging interference with visitation. There is simply
no substantial and material change of circumstances between the date of
the Divorce Decree and the date of the trial.
It is undisputed that Carolyne Sigg is a good mother, who has
been the primary care taker of the children, Nicola and Lindsay Sigg,
since birth, and that as a result of her care taking, the children are
healthy, happy, and doing well in school, and are well adjusted.

Not

surprisingly, the Court found that discussions with Henry Sigg created
"tension in the home" which was used as a basis to change custody. This
"tension" was given significantly greater credence in changing custody
than

the

recognized

value

of

stability

of

relationship fostering well adjusted children.

a

healthy

parenting

Elizabeth Stewart's

testimony regarding Carolyne Sigg crystallizes her bias and gives little
or no weight

to the

overriding

concerns
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of

this

Court

regarding

stability and maintaining a healthy custodial relationship and regarding
Henry Sigg, literally turns a blind eye to his failure to timely pay
alimony and child support, his threats, outrageous language and conduct.
The "best interests of the children" were simply ignored by the Court
and the evaluator in favor of protecting Henry Sigg's telephone contact
with his daughters.
The fees awarded were punitive in nature where there was no
violation of the visitation order of the Court and no showing of Henry
Sigg's need or Carolyne Sigg's ability to pay fees.
alimony

as of February,

Termination of

1993, was contrary to the evidence where

Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes maintained two totally separate households,
did

not

share

maintained

household

furniture,

expenses, mortgage

clothing

and

payments, assets, and

personal

property

in

separate

residences.
The cumulative effect of the Trial Court's action emasculates
and pulverizes the traditional legal notions of fostering stability in
the lives of children of divorced parents, rewarding positive parenting,
and discouraging foul, inappropriate, and criminal behavior. The Court
simply ignored precedential direction for and confines on its authority.
The Amended Decree of Divorce should be reversed in its
entirety.
DATED this

(Q ' d a y of January, 1995.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

By: 13. Paul Wood, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Carolyne Sigg
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CAROLYNE JOAN SIGG,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
HENRY ALFRED SIGG,
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Case No. 940650-CA

ooOoo
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered to
the following attorneys of record a copy of the revised Appellant's
Brief on the day and year set forth below:
Clark Sessions, Esq.
Dean C. Andreason, Esq.
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
201 South Main, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this

ft*'day

of May, 1995.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
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Exhibit "1" Divorce Decree, April 17, 1991
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Craig M. Peterson (2579)
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435

,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DECREE OF DIVORCE

CAROLYN BOWDEN SIGG,
Plaintiff,
v.
HENRY ALFRED SIGG,

Case No. 10482

Defendant.

ooOoo
The above matter came before the Court on April 3rd and
April 4, 1991, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, judge presiding for
trial.

The Plaintiff was present in person and represented by

counsel, Craig M. Peterson.

The Defendant was present in person

and represented by counsel, John B. Mason.

The Court having

heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
does now enter its Decree of Divorce as follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Each of the parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce

against the other upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
1
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2.

The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, custody

and control of the minor children of the parties.

There shall be

reserved in the Defendant reasonable rights of visitation which
will be consistent with those rights of visitation which have been
exercised

by

proceedings,

the

Defendant

every

during

other weekend,

the

pendency

every Tuesday

of

and

evening, and such other times as the parties may agree.
event the Plaintiff

these

Thursday
In the

should elect to reside in New Zealand or

elsewhere outside of the state of Utah, the Defendant shall be
entitled to exercise extended visitation for up to sixty (60) days
each year, which visitation shall take into consideration the
children's

school

schedules.

If the Defendant does exercise

extended visitation because of Plaintiff's move as herein set out,
the Defendant is entitled to exercise visitation in two separate
segments, at his option.
3.

In the event the Plaintiff does not move outside the

state of Utah, the Defendant shall be entitled to four weeks of
visitation
vacation.

during

the

summer

for

the

purpose

of

exercising

In the event the Defendant does not exercise vacation

during the summer, the Plaintiff shall have rights of visitation
with the children which are reciprocal to those herein reserved in
the Defendant.

If the Defendant does elect to take vacation with

the children during extended visitation, he shall not take the
2
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children outside of the United States without the Plaintiff's
consent.

The

Plaintiff

shall not unreasonably

withhold

her

consent, and if she does, the matter may be submitted to the Court
for determination.
4.

The parties shall freely and openly communicate

regarding

actions

to be taken in the best

interests

of the

children.

There shall be reserved in the Defendant the right to

receive and review the schooling and academic records of the
children, all medical and dental records, and all social and
religious

records

of

importance.

In

those

instances

where

duplicate records are not provided by the children's school or
medical provider, the Plaintiff will forward copies of those
records to the Defendant, such as the children's report cards and
parent-teacher notices.

The Defendant shall have the right of

access to school and medical records and to participate in parentteacher conferences and other regularly scheduled school activities
of the children.

The parties shall take no action to interfere in

the enhancement of the other's relationship with the children, nor
any action which may be construed in any respect as derogatory
toward the other parent in that relationship. In the accommodation
and

exercise

consideration

of visitation, the parties will

take

into the

of the children's needs to be in attendance at

B00KMPACE632
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activities and shall give close attention to those activities and
facilitate the children's participation therein.
5.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff $344 per

month per child as child support for a total of $688 per month.
Child support will be paid in one lump sum on or before the 5th day
of each month through the Clerk of the Court.

Child support shall

be paid by the Defendant until such time as the minor children
reach the age of eighteen (18) or graduate from high school with
their normal graduating class, whichever shall occur later.
6.

The Defendant shall provide health and accident

insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties.
Any medical or dental expenses which are incurred for the children
not paid for by the policy of insurance, shall be shared equally by
the parties.
1.

The Defendant

shall maintain

a policy

of term

insurance upon his life in the amount of $100,000, naming the minor
children

as beneficiaries

thereunder.

Such policy

shall be

maintained until the Defendant is no longer required to pay child
support pursuant to the provisions of this Decree or further orders
of this Court.
8.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of

$500 per month as and for alimony, which alimony shall terminate as
provided by law or upon further Order of this Court. Alimony shall
4
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be paid in one lump sum on or before the 5th day of each month
through the Clerk of the Court.
9,

The Plaintiff shall be awarded all right, title and

interest in real and personal property as follows:
a.

The home and real property located at 2724

Creek Drive, Park City, Utah, and the Defendant shall execute a
Quit Claim Deed in favor of the Plaintiff

for said property

forthwith.
b.

All

furniture,

furnishings

and

personal

property currently in possession of the Plaintiff.
c.

The 1987 Mercedes Benz 260E automobile.

d.

All cash accounts or savings accounts currently

e.

All right to any proceeds from the Monarch Life

in her name.

Insurance policy held in her name.
f.

All right to her Merrill Lynch independent

retirement account.
g.

The right to take custodial control of the

savings account of the parties' minor child, Niki Sigg.
10.

The Defendant shall be awarded all right, title and

interest in and to real and personal property as follows:

5
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a.

All interest in the Sigg Family Partnership and

the Plaintiff shall Quit Claim any interest she may have therein in
favor of the Defendant, which interest is as follows:
1.

The real property and residence located at
839 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah;

2.

The real property and residence located at
835 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah;

3.

The real property

known

as Lot

#265,

Highland Estates.
b.

All

furniture,

furnishings

and

personal

property currently in Defendant's possession.
c.

All cash and savings accounts currently held in

Defendant's name.
d.

All right and interest the parties may have in

e.

The Monarch Life Insurance policy currently in

Cougar Energy.

Defendant's name.
f.

The

Defendant's

Merrill

Lynch

independent

retirement account held in his name.
g.

Twelve (12) water shares in High Valley Water

h.

Any and all interest the parties may have in

Company.

the business known as MountainTops, Inc.

00UJ(j. t
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11.

There are certain checks belonging to the parties

which are currently in possession of Defendant's attorney.

The

value of these checks will be divided equally between the parties
and counsel for the Defendant shall execute checks to each of the
parties forthwith.
12.

The outstanding liabilities incurred by the parties

during the marriage shall be paid by each of them as follows:
a.

The Plaintiff shall assume and pay outstanding

liabilities as follows:
1.

The outstanding first mortgage owed on the
parties' marital residence at 2724 Creek
Drive.

2.

The outstanding liability owed to Chase
Bank for the Mercedes automobile.

3.

Any and all liabilities which she has
incurred in her own name since the
parties' separation from and after
June, 1990.

b.

The Defendant shall assume and pay outstanding

liabilities as follows:
1.

All Sigg Family Partnership liabilities.

2.

The outstanding mortgage payment owed to
Lucy Strieker for the real property

B00KKXPWP636
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located at 839 Woodside Avenue, Park City,
Utah.
The outstanding mortgage payment owed to
Chase Bank for the real property located
at 839 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah.
The outstanding mortgage owed to Colonial
Savings on the real property located at
835 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah.
Any outstanding liability which Defendant
owes for 1989 income taxes.
The outstanding liability owed to Monarch
Life Insurance Company for loans taken
by the Defendant on his life insurance
policy.
The outstanding liability owed to High
Valley Water Company for the water shares
being awarded to the Defendant.
Any and all liability associated with or
arising from the parties' business known
as MountainTops, Inc., including the
"Line of Credit."
Any and all liabilities the Defendant has
incurred from and after the date of the

8
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parties' separation of June, 1990.
13.

Each party shall file and pay their 1990 state and

federal income taxes individually. The Defendant shall provide to
the Plaintiff a copy of the 1990 income tax returns he files, and
he shall provide Plaintiff with a copy of his income tax return
which he files for each year thereafter.

Said copies are to be

provided to the Plaintiff at the same time as the Defendant files
the returns.
14.

The Defendant shall take all action necessary to

immediately remove the mortgage from the marital residence which
secures the "Line of Credit" used to finance the parties business,
MountainTops, Inc., and he shall secure the "Line of Credit" with
the real property

owned by MountainTops, Inc.

Further, the

Defendant shall use his best efforts to cause the mortgage on the
real property known as Lot #265, Highland Estates, to be removed
from that property as soon as possible and to transfer that
liability so that the real property owned by MountainTops, Inc.,
will act as security in place and in lieu of Lot #265, Highland
Estates, for the "Line of Credit."
15.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of

$60,000 as equalization of the property distribution between the
parties. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff $25,000 cash on
or before June 2, 1991.

The Defendant shall also pay to the
9
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Plaintiff the sum of $40,000, without interest, on or before April
1, 1992.

The Defendant shall execute a Promissory Note in the

amount of $40,000 and shall give Plaintiff a Deed of Trust to
secure that note on the property owned by MountainTops, Inc.

The

Deed of Trust given to the Plaintiff shall be second only to the
secured position given to the financial institution when the real
property owned by MountainTops, Inc. is used to secure the "Line of
Credit," which the Defendant is required to transfer from the
marital residence and Lot #265, Highland Estates, as hereinbefore
provided.

Further, as additional security for the note, the

Defendant shall give Plaintiff a Trust Deed for Lot #265, Highland
Estates.

This Promissory Note and Trust Deed shall become first

position on the Highland Estates property when the real property
owned by MountainTops, Inc., becomes the security for the "Line of
Credit"

used

by

the

business.

The

real

property

owned

by

MountainTops, Inc. shall not be used to secure a "Line of Credit"
which exceeds the current "Line of Credit" available that is now
secured by the marital residence and Lot #265, Highland Estates,
until such time as Defendant has satisfied this obligation owed to
the Plaintiff.
16.

The Defendant shall be required to make certain that

all payments, registration or taxes due on the property being
awarded to the Plaintiff are current as of April 3, 1991.
10
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17.

The

Plaintiff

is

awarded

Defendant in the amount of $17,500 as and

judgment

against

the

for attorney's fees and

costs which the Plaintiff has incurred in this matter.
DATED this (((?

day of April, 1991.
BY THE^OURT:

District Court Judge )
Approved as to form:
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Mason, Esq.
for Defendant
Sigg.DBC/P4
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit "2" Motion to Continue Trial, June 14, 1994

.SO.,

F l LE D
JUN 1 4 1994

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.

Clark ot Summit County

Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090

By

yjll
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN BOWDEN SIGG,
Plaintiff,

;
])

VS.

;

HENRY ALFRED SIGG,

])

Defendant.

)

MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL

Civil No. 89 43 10482
Judge David S. Young

Plaintiff hereby moves the court for continuance of the trial of the petition to modify the
decree of divorce in the above-entitled matter presently scheduled for June 14, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.
The grounds for this motion are as follows:
1.

The custody evaluation has not yet been completed. The parties are informed by

Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the custody evaluator, that the evaluation will be completed some time
Friday, June 10,1994. This is inadequate time to prepare the case for trial.
2.

Discovery has not yet been completed. As of the time of this motion, defendant

has not yet indicated what his income is. It is impossible properly to calculate child support
without such income information.

OOiiL'.'::,,

3.

Defendant has not answered plaintiffs interrogatories or formally responded to

plaintiffs request for production of documents, although seven boxes of documents have been
made available for inspection and copying within the last few days. Based on the documentation
made available to date, it is not possible to determine defendant's income. In addition, it is
impossible to review the documents within the time allowed.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for continuance of the trial should be
granted.
DATED this 9th day of January, 1994.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

s^

By.

ELLEN M^#COCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I transmitted a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION
FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL to the following, via facsimile transmission, this 9th day of
January, 1994:
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq.
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit "3" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
September 29, 1994

No.

Clark W. Sessions (2914)
Dean C. Andreasen (3981)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Telephone (801) 537-5555
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d«*«f Summit County

j Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
i
(

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

i
i

CAROLYNE JOAN SIGG,
i

:
:
:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
, HENRY ALFRED SIGG,
i
|
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 10482

:

Judge David S. Young

!

J

Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause and Defendant's Verified

I Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and related matters
I came on regularly for trial before the Honorable David S. Young one
! of the Judges of the Court on June 14 and 15, 1994. Plaintiff was
present and represented by Ellen Maycock, Esq. of Kruse, Landa &
Maycock, her attorneys.

Defendant was present and represented by

j Clark W. Sessions, Esq. and Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. of Campbell
| Maack & Sessions, his attorneys.

The Court heard and considered

I
! the sworn testimony of the parties and various witnesses, received
' and reviewed exhibits and documentary evidence offered by the
i

parties,

I

heard

and considered

the arguments

O0UU7-

of counsel, and

reviewed the files and records herein.

On September 23, 1994, the

Court heard argument from counsel for the parties on Plaintiff's
Objections to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree of Divorce.

The Court being fully advised in the

premises now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Decree of Divorce/Order and Judgment
1.

That the marriage of the parties was terminated by a

Decree of Divorce entered on April 17, 1991.
2.

That the Decree of Divorce, in relevant part, provided as

follows:
a.
Sigg

and

Plaintiff was awarded the sole custody of Nicola

Lindsay

Sigg,

the

minor

children

of

the

parties.

Defendant was awarded reasonable rights of visitation. At the time
the Decree of Divorce was entered, the parties anticipated that
Plaintiff might

"elect to reside in New Zealand or elsewhere

outside of the State of Utah."

In such event, the Decree of

Divorce provided that Defendant would be entitled to exercise
extended visitation for up to sixty days each year.
b.

The parties were ordered to "freely and openly

communicate regarding actions to be taken in the best interests of
the children."

Defendant was awarded the right to receive and

review all school, medical, dental, social and religious records of
importance.

Defendant was awarded the right to participate in the

childrenfs school activities including parent-teacher conferences
2

00067^:

and programs.

The parties were ordered to "take no action to

interfere in the enhancement of the other's relationship with the
children, nor any action which may be construed in any respect as
derogatory toward the other parent in that relationship.
c.

Plaintiff was awarded from Defendant child support

in the amount of $688.00 per month.
d.

Defendant was ordered to provide health insurance

for the benefit of the minor children. The parties were ordered to
equally pay for all uninsured medical costs incurred

for the

I benefit of the minor children.
e.

Plaintiff was awarded from Defendant alimony in the

I amount of $500.00 per month to "terminate as provided by law or
I upon further Order of this Court."
I
f.

Plaintiff

was

awarded,

among

other

items, the

marital home located in Park City subject to the mortgage thereon,
$65,000.00 as equalization of the property distribution between the
parties and $17,500.00 as attorney's fees.
g.
real property

Defendant was awarded, among other items, certain
subject to the mortgages

thereon, and

certain

partnership and business interests.
3.

That on September 24, 1991, the Court entered an Order

j and Judgment. The Order and Judgment provided, in relevant part as
J follows:
I
a.

Defendant was ordered to obtain a health insurance

I policy for the benefit of the minor children with "a deductible of

not

more

than

$200.00 •

However,

in

the

event

there

is a

jl substantial difference in cost by obtaining a health and accident
,' insurance policy with a deductible amount of $500.00, then the

ij
j| Defendant shall be allowed to maintain such an insurance policy."
ii

b.

,j visitation.

"The parties shall begin to cooperate to facilitate
Further, in the event the Defendant is going to be

ij late in picking up the children or returning them, he shall be
I! required to call the Plaintiff and advise her accordingly."
i Termination Of Alimony Due To Cohabitation
4.

That Defendant paid to Plaintiff alimony through April

1993, in the amount of $500.00 per month but has paid no alimony
since that time based on his claim that Plaintiff was and is
cohabiting with one Victor Haynes.
,,

5.

That in the summer of 1992, following the sale of the

•i
I marital residence awarded to her in the divorce, Plaintiff and the
•i

j| parties1 minor children traveled to Boulder, Colorado where she and
the parties1 minor children lived with Mr. Haynes for approximately
five days until she and the minor children traveled to Disneyland
and to New Zealand.
6.

That prior to traveling to New Zealand, while residing in

Boulder, Colorado, Plaintiff had no place of residence other than
with Mr. Haynes; that her personal effects were located there and
that Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes effectively resided together and
!j maintained an on-going relationship including sexual intercourse
I;
i| admitted to by the Plaintiff.

I
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i

7.

That Mr. Haynes traveled to New Zealand during the 1992

Christmas holiday and resided with Plaintiff for approximately a
|! two week period.
I

8.

I children

In or

about

returned

to

February
Boulder,

1993, Plaintiff
Colorado

and

from

the

New

minor

Zealand.

I Plaintiff's primary reason for returning to Boulder, Colorado was
II to continue her relationship with Mr. Haynes.
I

9.

That following her return from New Zealand to Boulder,

j Colorado in February 1993, the parties in effect resided together
!J even though for some period of time they had separate condominiums
in the same condominium complex.
10.

That while residing in Boulder, Colorado, following her

I] return from New Zealand, Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes maintained a
i
11 continuing relationship including sexual intercourse; shared living
I expenses; shared open access to each other's condominium

units

J either by reason of a key which Mr. Haynes was given by Plaintiff
or access to a hidden key, the location of which was disclosed by
the Plaintiff to Mr. Haynes; ate meals together and shared expenses
for food and incidentals; maintained their clothing in the same
condominium;

used

the

same

furniture;

Mr.

Haynes

parked

his

I automobile on occasion at Plaintiff's residence; and Plaintiff and
Mr. Haynes otherwise lived as though they were husband and wife.
I

11.

j acquired

That in or about August 1993, Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes
a

residence

and

real

property

together

in

Boulder,

II Colorado and do not dispute that they cohabited each with the other
ji

il

OOOGVo

ii and have done so since the acquisition of such residence and real

jl
11 property.
i!
I1
12. That based on the foregoing findings of fact, Plaintiff
I and Mr. Haynes began to cohabit no later than February 1993 and,
ii

I

accordingly, Defendant's obligation for alimony should terminate as

t

t of February 1993.
!

13.

1

That based on the foregoing findings of fact, Defendant

has over paid Plaintiff $1,000.00 for alimony and should receive

,»• credit in that amount against his child support obligation.
Health Insurance
||

14.

That the Decree of Divorce requires Defendant to provide

i health and accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children
i of the parties and further that the parties have agreed that
!

i

II Defendant maintain such insurance with a deductible between the
ii

I j amounts of $200.00 and $500.00.
,i

II

15.

That in order to reduce the premiums for such insurance,

i!

J it is reasonable that the Defendant provide insurance with a
| deductible of $1,000.00 provided that he pay the first $750.00 of
11 medical expenses for the care and treatment of the parties' minor
H children and that thereafter the parties share medical expenses
!
ii

|| equally.
|i

16.

That it is reasonable that if Plaintiff is able to obtain

|j health and medical insurance through her employment at a better or
, reduced rate at no cost to her, she should acquire such insurance
i and save Defendant that cost.
6
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I Child Care

I

17.

That Plaintiff has, until very recently been employed by

I Mr. Haynes and worked out of the home she acquired with Mr. Haynes
in Boulder, Colorado.
18.

That while Plaintiff could not work as fully and without

! interruption out of a home with children present as she could
j without the children being present, the majority of the child care
i

1

costs incurred were not necessary.

Plaintiff withdrew her claim

I for day care costs attributable to Ms. Margaret Braae in open
Court.

While the evidence was not clear as to the allocation of

expenses between the parties' two minor children, it is equitable
(that of the total amount claimed due and owing to Children's World
Learning Center principally for the day care of Lindsay Sigg in the
I amount of $2,816.00 for the year 1993 and $1,461 for the year 1994
| through April 22 or a total of $4,277, one-third thereof or $1,425
should be the sole responsibility of the Plaintiff and the balance
should be assumed and paid by the parties equally.
19.

That it is equitable that the parties equally share any

necessary employment-related child care costs incurred

in the

I future.
Attorney's Fees
20.

That as more fully hereinafter set forth, Defendant has

been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position to assert his
parental rights of visitation due to Plaintiff's actions, which
i

I actions are without excuse or justification.
7

21.

That Defendant has been required to incur attorney's fees

and costs in enforcing the provisions of the Decree of Divorce and
the Order and Judgment.
22.

That Plaintiff's conduct as hereinafter more fully set

I forth was so extreme in nature that it is appropriate and equitable
J to require Plaintiff to bear some of Defendant's attorneys' fees
I and costs relative to his Petition to Modify.
23.

That it is equitable that Plaintiff

assume and pay

j

j Defendant's costs and expenses incurred in connection with these
j| proceedings in the amount of $9,302.48 to Campbell Maack & Sessions
through May 31, 1994, and further that Defendant's counsel is
authorized to submit to the Court an affidavit of fees and costs
II incurred from May 31, 1994, through the conclusion of this matter
) for further consideration by the Court.
|

24.

That it is equitable that Plaintiff pay Defendant's costs

ij

and expenses connected with his travel to Boulder, Colorado on
December 20, 1993, in the amount of $250.00, the impoundment of his
I vehicle in the amount of $60.00 and the attorneys' fees charged by
I Michael Enwall, Esq. in his representation of Defendant in a
|j pending criminal proceeding initiated at the behest and insistence
j of Victor Haynes with the knowledge of Plaintiff.
II fees are in the amount of $1,000.00.

Said attorney's

j!
i|

||

25.

That the charges and expenses of Elizabeth Stewart, Ph.D.

|: of $2,000 for the evaluation plus her testimony at trial in the sum
jj of $700.00 plus the additional amount of $333.34 owing for the

!l
||
!i
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I review of documents shall be paid by Plaintiff.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant the amount of $2,683.34 for the
amounts Defendant has paid Dr. Stewart. Plaintiff has already paid
! Dr. Stewart $350.00.
I

26.

That it is equitable that the parties otherwise pay their

j own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this case.
i

! Custody/Visitation
|

27.

That the Decree of Divorce provides that the parties

shall freely and openly communicate regarding actions to be taken
I in the best interests of the children, that Plaintiff will forward
copies of

the children's

school

and medical

records

to the

Defendant, including the children's report cards and parent-teacher
i
1 notices.
28.

That Plaintiff has not complied with those provisions

i since moving from Park City, Utah in 1992.
29.

That during the spring of 1992 when Plaintiff sold her

I residence and made plans to leave Park City permanently, she did
I not advise Defendant of such plans in writing or otherwise nor did
she advise Defendant that she was going to Boulder, Colorado to
stay with Mr. Haynes nor to travel to New Zealand.

Further, she

failed to make any arrangements for the parties' children to visit
i with Defendant while she was out of state.
30.

That Plaintiff traveled to New Zealand with the parties'

J children and stayed at her parents' residence. Defendant found out
! that Plaintiff had traveled to New Zealand and spoke with her by
9
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telephone within minutes of her arrival.

Defendantf s subsequent

telephone calls to learn of the whereabouts of his children were
not accepted or no information about the children was given by
Plaintiff or her parents to Defendant.
31.

That Plaintiff while in New Zealand moved

from her

parents home to a friends home, but did not provide Defendant with
a telephone number or other information so that visitation could be
arranged.

Similarly,

Plaintiff's

parents

would

not

provide

Defendant with a telephone number or other information about the
whereabouts of Plaintiff or the minor children. Neither Plaintiff
nor

her

parents

were

candid

or

forthcoming

in

providing

information.
32.

That Defendant was required to hire a private detective

to locate his children and traveled

to New Zealand where he

remained for a period of approximately five weeks. Defendant hired
counsel and instituted a proceeding in New Zealand relating to
visitation with and custody of his children. The New Zealand court
found that Plaintiff had not violated the Utah divorce decree for
the reason that insufficient time had elapsed to establish whether
Plaintiff would permit 60 days of visitation within the one year
period of her having left the State of Utah during the summer of
1992. While mediation was attempted, Defendant, in the entire five
week period while in New Zealand, saw his children on only one
occasion in the presence of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's father for a

10
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period of less than two hours even though requests for visitation
were made continuously by Defendant.
33.

That when Plaintiff moved to Boulder, Colorado with the

children and later purchased a home in 1993 with Mr. Haynes,
!| Defendant was only given a business telephone number (the only

»i
number available for a period of time) through which he could
I contact his children and Defendant became frustrated and angry when

1(

!l
II his

calls

met

with

answering

machine

messages

and

finally

i

11 instructions from Mr. Haynes that the Defendant could only speak
!

with

his

children

two

evenings

each

week

at

7:00

p.m.

11 Subsequently, a personal telephone line was obtained but Plaintiff
.! was not candid or forthcoming in providing the number to Defendant.
•I

34.

That Defendant visited with the children in August 1992

11 on the east coast for a family reunion.

Defendant and the minor

I children informed Plaintiff that the children would be returned
late.

Plaintiff should have consented to such since the request

was reasonable and Defendant was not attempting to annoy Plaintiff.
However, due to the animosity between the parties, Plaintiff would
not consent to the additional days of visitation.

Defendant was

late returning the children from time to time although he informed
Plaintiff

of

late

returns

due

to

weather

conditions,

plane

schedules and other situations.
35.

That Defendant, pursuant to a pre-arranged agreement with

i Plaintiff, traveled to Boulder, Colorado on December 20, 1993, to

.!
i

n
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visit with his children during the Christmas holiday between
December 20 and 30, 1993.
36.

That Plaintiff informed Defendant that he could pick up

the children but he could do so only at a lot adjacent to a bank in
Boulder, Colorado at 10:00 a.m. on December 20 and further that
|; notwithstanding his objection to picking up the children in a
I commercial parking lot, he traveled to the appointed place and when
i

|l the children were not present at the appointed time, called the

'I
j residence of Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes from a mobile telephone.
'I
37. That when there was no answer, he returned to his vehicle
ij

|j and was thereupon arrested and incarcerated based upon a telephone
j harassment complaint filed by Mr. Haynes with the knowledge of
h Plaintiff.
i j

!j
l|

38.

i! appointed

That Plaintiff did not deliver the children to the
place

notwithstanding

her

agreement

to

do

so

and

following the posting of bail by Defendant he was denied visitation
| with his children other than in the presence of a social worker in
i

a supervised situation which he declined and thereafter returned to
ii the State of Utah.
39.

That Lindsay Sigg stated to Dr. Stewart her preference to

j| live with her father and gave good reasons therefor, most of which
I! related to her not caring for Mr. Haynes.

Further, that the

| parties' child Nicola was less definite in her preference, but
j I expressed problems she had with Mr. Haynes.
ri

I

40.

That since the divorce of the parties, Defendant has

remarried and his current wife Amy has a daughter with whom the
parties1 minor children have a warm and comfortable relationship.
That the parties1 minor children are doing well in school

41.

I and there is no reason to believe that they would not continue to
1 progress and achieve in the Park City school system with which the
parties' oldest child is familiar and in which she was been
l enrolled.
I
I

42.

That the children are closely bonded with each of their

j parents with the exception that tension has been created by
Plaintiff because of her limiting or controlling the children's
contact

with

Defendant

and

further

that

Defendant

has

made

I considerable sacrifices to be close to his children and was even
j willing to sell his businesses and move to their domicile, if
j
I necessary, in order to be with his children.
43.

That the custody and visitation arrangements worked well

during the first fifteen months following the parties1 divorce, but
I deteriorated steadily since Plaintiff departed with the children to
Colorado

and

New

Zealand

and

she

has

failed

to

facilitate

visitation with the children except on her terms which are not in
I their best interests.
I

44.

That the children were born and raised in Park City,

Utah, attended

school and pre-school

there and are generally

j acquainted and comfortable with their surroundings there.
13
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45.

That the environment offered by Defendant is a stable one

with permanent employment, a satisfactory remarriage relationship
and extended family and friends with whom the parties' minor
children are acquainted.
46.

That the findings in relationship to the legal factors to

be considered as specified and detailed by Dr. Stewart are adopted
herein

as

the

findings

of

the

Court

and

further

that

the

recommendations that Dr. Stewart has made are well founded in fact.
47.

That although Plaintiff has been an attentive mother who

was not neglecting the minor children, and the minor children were
generally doing well in her custody, it is in the best interests of
the parties' minor children that custody be changed from Plaintiff
to Defendant for the principal reason, among others, that Defendant
will facilitate visitation between Plaintiff and the minor children
whereas Plaintiff has a history of interfering with Defendant's
visitation with the minor children. It is in the best interests of
the minor children that a relationship with both parents be
fostered. The probability of a healthy relationship being fostered
with both parents will be enhanced if Defendant is the custodial
parent.
1994.

The change in custody should become effective July 1,

There should be visitation that should be liberally granted

by Defendant to Plaintiff which would include a significant summer
visitation with Plaintiff.

14
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48.

That it is in the children's best interest that they

should be enrolled in the Park City School District during the next
academic year while residing with Defendant.
|l
il

49.

That the Court adopts the statutory visitation schedule

11 but it is in the best interests that such visitation schedule be
I, viewed

as

a minimum

and

that

additional

visitation

be

made

11 available.
|j

50.

That it is in the children's best interest that they

il

j should have complete and open access to both parents by telephone
!

i and that all private telephone numbers should be given to the

| children and to the parties hereto.
;!

51.

If Haynes

That it is in the children's best interest that Victor
be

excluded

from

any

involvement

whatsoever

in

the

.1

ji relationship of the children with their father and that Mr. Haynes
should not interfere with that relationship in any respect and that
he should be so advised by Plaintiff.
Child Support
52.

That based on the foregoing findings of fact determining

that Defendant has overpaid Plaintiff $1,000.00 for alimony and
jl should receive a credit in that amount against his child support
j

!

|| obligation, the Court otherwise finds that Defendant is delinquent
!

i

11 in his child support obligations under the Decree of Divorce and
;!

»| the Order and Judgment in the amount of $37.50 for February 1994,
ij $688.00 for May 1994 and $668.00 for June 1994, which amounts
i

| should be offset against any amounts Plaintiff owes Defendant.
15
i
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Further, Defendant owes Plaintiff $263.94 for various medical
expense reimbursement which amount should be offset against any
amounts Plaintiff owes Defendant.
53.
action,

That the parties have stipulated for purposes of this
Plaintiff's

gross

monthly

income

is

$2,800.00

and

Defendant's gross monthly income is $4,333.00.
54.

That pursuant to the Child Support Obligation Worksheet

I attached hereto as Exhibit A, child support is awarded to Defendant
i

j from Plaintiff in the amount of $466.00 per month for the two minor
1

children

commencing

July

1,

1994, and

continuing

each

month

i

| thereafter until a child attains the age of 18 years or graduates
J from high school, if later, or otherwise becomes emancipated, at
!

which time child support shall cease for that child, and child

i

j support shall be recomputed for the remaining child.
i

I
55. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-45-7.11, child
! support shall be reduced by fifty percent (50%) for each child for

i
J time periods during which Plaintiff has extended visitation with
that child for at least 25 of 30 consecutive days.
j

56.

That an immediate withhold an deliver order shall be

j entered pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. section 62A11-401 et seq., relative to Plaintiff's child support obligation
I including an order assessing against Plaintiff an additional $7.00
i

I per month as a check processing fee to be included in the amount
withheld.

j

57.

That the parties shall equally pay for one-half of all

necessary and reasonable travel costs associated with the exercise
of visitation.
58.

That based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court

finds that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred and,
accordingly, the Decree of Divorce and the Order and Judgment
should be modified as set forth herein.
BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and adopts the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That

Plaintiff

and

Victor

Haynes

entered

into

a

cohabitation arrangement as of the end of February 1993, and as
such, no alimony is due or payable by the Defendant

to the

Plaintiff after the end of February 1993.
2.

That

Defendant

should

be

given

credit

for

alimony

payments made for the months of March and April 1993 in the total
amount of $1,000 against obligations, if any, he owes to Plaintiff.
3.

That Defendant should be ordered to maintain medical

insurance with a deductible of $1,000 but he should pay the first
$750 of medical expenses annually for the care and treatment of the
parties' minor children and that thereafter the parties shall bear
all uninsured medical expenses equally.
4.

That if Plaintiff can obtain medical insurance through

her employment at a better or reduced rate, she shall do so.
17
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5.

That one-third of the day care expenses incurred by the

Plaintiff of $1,425.00 are her sole responsibility and that the
balance of $2,852.00 shall be assumed and paid by the parties
equally.
6.

That Plaintiff shall assume and pay the fees and costs

and expenses incurred by the Defendant to Campbell Maack & Sessions
in the

amount

of

$9,302.48

through

May

31,

1994, and

such

additional amounts as the Court may subsequently determine by
affidavit submitted by Defendant's counsel.
7.

That Plaintiff shall assume, pay and discharge the costs

and expenses of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart in the total sum of $3,033.34
by reimbursing Defendant the amount of $2,683.34.

Plaintiff has

already paid Dr. Stewart the amount of $350.00.
8.

That

Plaintiff

shall

reimburse

Defendant

for

costs

incurred relative to the Boulder visitation on December 20, 1993,
in the amount of $310.00, and further that Plaintiff shall pay
Defendant's attorneyf s fees and costs in the defense of the
criminal action initiated at the behest and insistence of Victor
Haynes in the amount of $1,000.00.
9.

That the parties shall bear their own costs and expenses

including attorneys1 fees incurred in connection herewith other
than as hereinabove set forth.
10.

That

Victor

Haynes

should

be

excluded

from

any

involvement or interference with the relationship of Defendant with
the minor children and Plaintiff shall so advise him.
18
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11.

That the children should be provided complete and open

access to both parents by telephone, that all private telephone
numbers shall be given to the children and to the other party.
12.

That there has been a significant change of circumstances

with respect to the custody and visitation as previously ordered by
I) the Court.
13.

That there has been a flagrant disregard of the rights of

j|Defendant by Plaintiff and no desire to be flexible, cooperative or
I supportive.
'!

14.

That the custody of the parties' minor children shall be

!l
11 changed

from

Plaintiff

to

Defendant

as

of

July

1,

1994

and

, Plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable visitation rights with the
Mparties' minor children to include at least a minimum the standard
il
!l statutory visitation schedule.
il
ji

15.

That the children shall be enrolled in the Park City

i1 School District during the next academic year.
I

16.

That Defendant is delinquent in his child support and

!J medical reimbursement payments in the amounts of $1,413.50 and

l|
ji$263.94, which should be offset against amounts owed by Defendant
j! to Plaintiff.
ji
I
17. That Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant as and for child

ij
II support the sum of $466.00 per month in accordance with the child
ij support worksheet, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
• "A" commencing July 1, 1994.
ii
;i
!j

!

1
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18.

That the Court shall make and enter its amendment to the

Decree of Divorce accordingly.
DATED this I^T^lay of

^j^pjit^^
BY THE COURT:

1994.
^\!lll^7""4

l

DAVID S.
District

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK

Ellen Maycock/
Attorneys kor Defendant
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

i A J-tyy /,

l^/M.-/]
/Y^^zA

Dean C. Andreasen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ^ ^ L d a y of September, 1994, I
caused the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be
hand-delivered to the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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,W THE Third DISTRICT C^c
Summit COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
yne Joan Sigg

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)

vs.
Civil No. 89-4310482
Alfred Sigg

!

Mother

|

Father

| Combined

mber of natural and adopted
!////////////!////////////!
ildren of this mother and father.j////////////!////////////!

j
!

2

ross monthly income.

!$

2800

!$

4333

!///////////!

reviously ordered alimony
ctually paid.

i
!-

0

!
|-

0

!///////////!
!///////////!

reviously ordered child support. |-

0

|-

0

!///////////!

ptional: Share of child support |
bligation for children in
|resent home.
!

0

j
j!

0

!///////////!
!///////////!
j
!

2800

!
|$

4333

justed Monthly Gross for child
pport purposes.

!
!$

se Combined Support
ligation (both parents).

!////////////!////////////!
!////////////!////////////!$

rcentage of COMBINED adjusted
mthly gross.

i
!

39.25

ich parent's share of Base
ipport Obligation.

|
!$

466

iildrenfs portion of monthly
|
tdical and dental insurance
|
erniums paid to insurance company.!mthly work or training related
tild care expense.

i
%|
!
|$

0

!
!
|-

60.75

!
!$

!
!

7133

!
j

1188

!///////////!
%!///////////!
!///////////!
!///////////!

722

0

!///////////!
!///////////!
!///////////!

!////////////!////////////!
!////////////!////////////!$

!
!

0

BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD

!$

466

i
i

Adjusted Base Child Support Award.

!$

466

i
i

Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child

!$

233

i
i

CHILD CARE AWARD WHEN ACTUALLY INCURRED

!$
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theT^i-yjLday

of September, 1994, I

caused the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be
hand-delivered to the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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.,* THE Third DISTRICT C i
Summit COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
:arolyne Joan Sigg

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)

vs,

Civil No. 89-4310482

lenry Alfred Sigg

!

Mother

J

Father

! Combined

L. Number of natural and adopted
!////////////!////////////!
children of this mother and father.j////////////!////////////!

2

j

j

>a. Gross monthly income.

!$

2800

!$

4333

!///////////!

lb.

!
j-

0

!
i-

0

!///////////!
i///////////!

Ic.

Previously ordered child support, j-

0

j-

0

\///////////\

Id.

Optional: Share of child support |
obligation for children in
|present home.
!

0

J
i!

0

!///////////!
!///////////!
!
!

Previously ordered alimony
actually paid.

1. Adjusted Monthly Gross for child
support purposes.

!
!$

1. Base Combined Support

\////////////\////////////\

obligation (both parents).

2800

4333

!
|$

!
!

39.25

5. Each parent's share of Base
Support Obligation.

!
!$

466

7. Children1s portion of monthly
!
medical and dental insurance
!
premiums paid to insurance company.',-

!
%!
!
!$

0

j
!
i-

!
7133 j

I

',////////////\////////////\$

5. Percentage of COMBINED adjusted
monthly gross.

3. Monthly work or training related
child care expense.

!
!$

1188
60.75

|

!///////////!
%!///////////!
!///////////!
!///////////!

722

0

!///////////!
I///////////!
!///////////!

\////////////\////////////\
1////////////!////////////!$

!
j

0

! 9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD

!$

466

i

110. Adjusted Base Child Support Award.

!$

466

i

in.

IS

233

i
i

Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child

|12. CHILD CARE AWARD WHEN ACTUALLY INCURRED
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit "4" Amended Decree of Divorce. September 29. 1994

No.

FILED
Clark W. Sessions (2914)
Dean C. Andreasen (3981)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Telephone (801) 537-5555

SEP 29 1994

(=./(,(

Clerk of Summit County

, ~ ,

Br

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
jj CAROLYNE JOAN SIGG,
AMENDED DECREE
OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
HENRY ALFRED SIGG,

Civil No. 10482

Defendant.

Judge David S. Young

Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause and Defendant's Verified
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and related matters
came on regularly for trial before the Honorable David S. Young one
of the Judges of the Court on June 14, and 15, 1994. Plaintiff was
present and represented by Ellen Maycock, Esq. of Kruse, Landa &
Maycock, her attorneys.

Defendant was present and represented by

Clark W. Sessions, Esq. and Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. of Campbell
! Maack & Sessions, his attorneys. On September 23, 1994, the Court
j heard

argument

from

counsel

for

the

parties

on

Plaintiff's

i

i Objections to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
j Law and Decree of Divorce.

The Court having heretofore made and
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entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereby orders,
adjudges and decrees as follows:
1.

Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce entered on

April 17, 1991 (the "Decree") and paragraph 6 of the Order and
Judgment entered on September 24, 1991 (the "Order"), are hereby
deleted and the following substituted therefore:
That Defendant be and he is hereby awarded the
permanent care, custody and control of the minor children
of the parties and Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded
reasonable rights of visitation with the partiesf minor
children as the parties may agree but to include, at a
minimum, the standard statutory visitation schedule, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A,"

The

parties1 minor children should be provided complete and
open access to both parties by telephone and all private
telephone numbers shall be given to the children and to
each of the parties and further that the parties minor
children shall be enrolled

in the Park City School

District during the next academic year.
That the parties shall freely and openly communicate
regarding actions to be taken in the best interest of
their children and shall have the right of access to
school

and

medical

records

and

to

participate

in

parent/teacher conferences and regularly scheduled school

BOOKRRPAGE 7 6 9
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activities
visitation

of

the

rights

consideration

children•
the

In

parties

the children's

the
will

exercise
take

of
into

schedules, commitments,

needs and requirements and shall take no action to
interfere in the enhancement of the other's relationship
with the children nor pursue any action or conduct which
is in any respect derogatory or demeaning toward the
other parent in their relationship with their minor
children.
Victor Haynes is excluded from any involvement or
interference with the relationship of Defendant with the
minor children and Plaintiff shall so advise him.
2.

Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is deleted and the

following substituted therefore:
Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant as child support
the amount of Four Hundred Sixty Six Dollars ($466.00)
per month for the two minor children commencing July 1,
1994, and continuing each month thereafter until a child
attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high
school, if later, or otherwise becomes emancipated, at
which time child support shall cease for that child, and
child support shall be recomputed

for the remaining

child.

BOOKRK PAGE 7 7 0
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-45-7.11, child
support shall be reduced by fifty percent (50%) for each
child

for

time

periods

during

which

Plaintiff

has

extended visitation with that child for at least 25 of 30
consecutive days.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 62A-11-401 et
seq., an immediate withhold and deliver order shall be
entered relative to Plaintiff's child support obligation
including

an

order

assessing

against

Plaintiff

an

additional $7.00 per month as a check processing fee to
be included in the amount.
The parties shall equally pay for all necessary and
reasonable travel costs associated with the exercise of
visitation.
3.

Paragraph 6 of the Decree and paragraph 3 of the Order

are hereby deleted and the following substituted therefore:
That Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain medical
insurance covering the partiesf minor children during the
period

child

deductible

of

support

is

payable

$1,000.00 provided

hereunder
that

with

Defendant

a
is

ordered to pay the first $750.00 of medical expenses
annually for the care and treatment of the parties' minor
children and that thereafter the parties are ordered to
equally pay all uninsured medical expenses. In the event
4
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Plaintiff is able to obtain medical insurance through her
employment at a better or reduced rate, she is ordered to
do so and in such event Defendant is ordered to insure
the excess coverage.
4.

Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree are hereby deleted.

5.

Paragraph 18 is added to the Decree as follows:
18.

That Defendant is awarded

judgment against

Plaintiff for the amount of $10,192.38 calculated as
follows and as may be augmented as provided herein: the
amount

of

$1,000.00

constituting

an

overpayment

of

alimony for the months of March and April, 1993; legal
fees and costs to Campbell Maack & Sessions through May
31, 1994 in the sum of $9,302.48 to be augmented as the
Court may determine; fees of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart paid
by Defendant in the amount of $2,683.34; the amount of
$310.00

relative

to

Defendant's

visit

to

Boulder,

Colorado in December 1993; the attorney's fees charged by
Michael

Enwall

in

the

amount

of

$1,000.00;

less

Defendant's share of work-related day care expenses of
$1,426.00; less the amount of $1,413.50 for past due
child support owed by Defendant; less the amount of
$263.94 for medical reimbursement owed by Defendant.

5
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Paragraph 19 is added to the Decree as follows:
19.

That each of the parties shall bear their own

costs and

expenses

incurred

in this case

including

attorney's fees other than is hereinabove set forth.
That all other terms, provisions and conditions of the Decree
of Divorce shall remain in full force and effect to the extent the
same are not in conflict herewith.
DATED this

^ ^ S a y of ^ ^ ^ v Z x ^ I ^ ^

1994.

BY THE COURT:

DAVID S. Y
District J

^COUNTY^/

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK

'"'Milium****

?fih~.

E l l e n Ma

Attorneys/tor Defendant
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

L/a,
Dean C. Andreasen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the £(&lL day of September 1994, I
caused the foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to be hand-delivered
to the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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U.C.A. SEC. 30-3-35 MINIMUM SCHEDULE FOR VISITATION
(Summarized)
Effective May 3, 1993

Reasonable Visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. If they are not able
to agree, the definition for school-age children (beginning kindergarten) will be as follows:
Midweek:

One weekday evening specified from 5:30 - 8:30 p.m.

Alternate Weekends:

Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m.

Holidays take presedence over the weekend visitarion and weekend schedule doesn't
change.
Holiday Visitation:

(6:00 p.m. day before holiday to 7:00 p.m. day of unless
specified otherwise)

Odd Numbered Years
Human Rights Day
Easter from Fri. 6:00 p.m. to Sun 7:00 p.m.
Memorial Day Fri. 6:00 p.m.
to Mon. 7:00 p.m.
July 24th to 11:00 p.m.
Veteran's Day
Day before or after Child's Birthday
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
First Half Christmas Vacation, including
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day
to 1:00 p.m.

Even Numbered Years
New Year's Day
President's Day
July 4th to 11:00 p.m.
Labor Day from Fri. 6:00 to Mon. 7:00 p.m.
Columbus Day
UEA weekend from Wed. 6:00 p.m. to
Sun. 7:00 p.m.
Child's Actual Birthday to 9:00 p.m.
Thanksgiving from Wed 7:00 p.m. to
Sun. 7:00 p.m.
Second Half Christmas Vacation 1:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m. Christmas Day

Father's Dav:

With Father 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

Mother's Dav:

With Mother 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

Summer:

4 weeks during summer or, if year round, 1/2 school breaks,
custodial parent allowed two weeks uninterputed. Notification of
summer visitation or vacation weeks with children should be
provided in writing to the other parent at least 30 days in advance.

Telephone:

Contact atreasonablehours

BOOKRKPAGE ? 7 5
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit "5" Judged Ruling. June 15. 1994

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

* * *

CAROLYN JOAN SIGG,
CIVIL NO. D-89-431-0482

PLAINTIFF,
-VS-

JUDGE'S RULING

HENRY SIGG,
DEFENDANT.

* * *

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON WEDNESDAY, THE 15TH DAY
OF JUNE, 1994, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 3:20 O'CLOCK
P.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, STATE OF UTAH.

* * *

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

1

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

ELLEN MAYCOCK
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
EIGHTH FLOOR, BANK TOWER
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

CLARK W. SESSIONS
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
ONE UTAH CENTER
THIRTEENTH FLOOR
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

* * *

I N D E X

JUDGE'S RULING

PAGE 3

* * *

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

2

P R O C E E D I N G S
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, ALL RIGHT.

I'VE HAD THE

BENEFIT OF HEARING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PARTIES NOW FOR TWO
DAYS AND I WANT TO MAKE A COUPLE OF PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
PRIOR TO RULING.
I'VE ALREADY MADE THE COMMENT THAT I REALLY DO
BELIEVE THAT BOTH OF YOU NEED TO HAVE THE ATTITUDE THAT YOU
WANT THE CHILDREN TO HAVE AS GOOD A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
OTHER PARENT AS YOU REALLY WANT THEM TO HAVE WITH YOURSELF.
AND THAT ATTITUDE CAN ONLY BE EXPRESSED THROUGH YOUR CONDUCT, THROUGH THE WAY YOU TREAT EACH OTHER, THROUGH THE WAY
YOU DEAL WITH THE CHILDREN. AND UNLIKE ANY OTHER ORDER
THAT A COURT EVER ENTERS, IF I ENTER A JUDGMENT AGAINST
SOMEBODY IT IS A REAL AND FIXED ORDER.

IT IS ESTABLISHED.

BUT A CUSTODY ORDER, OR A VISITATION ORDER, IS CONSTANTLY
SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND MODIFICATION.

IT HAS TO BE DEALT

WITH IN THE FUTURE. IT IS A PRESENT ORDER DEALING WITH
FUTURE EVENTS. AND THE PROBLEM WITH IT IS THAT ALMOST NO
MATTER WHAT I DECIDE, DEPENDING UPON HOW THE PARTIES WISH
TO IMPLEMENT THE ORDER, IT WILL MAKE THE DECISION OF THE
JUDGE RIGHT OR WRONG.

IN OTHER WORDS, WHATEVER I DECIDE,

IF YOU IMPLEMENT IT WELL, IT MAKES IT RIGHT; WHATEVER I
DECIDE, IF YOU IMPLEMENT IT POORLY, IT MAKES IT WRONG.
NOW, IN 1991 THE DISTRICT COURT STATED THAT THE
PLAINTIFF, THEN MS. SIGG, WAS AWARDED PERMANENT CARE,

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILDREN.

NOW I'M AWARE

THAT THAT ORDER WAS MODIFIED IN PART AS TO THE VISITATION
WITH THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER, BUT THERE SHALL BE RESERVED IN
THE DEFENDANT REASONABLE RIGHTS OF VISITATION WHICH WILL BE
CONSISTENT WITH THOSE RIGHTS OF VISITATION WHICH HAVE BEEN
EXERCISED BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THESE
ACTIONS:

EVERY OTHER WEEKEND, EVERY TUESDAY AND THURSDAY

AND SO ON.
AND THEN IT TALKS ABOUT IN THE EVENT THE PLAINTIFF DETERMINES TO GO TO NEW ZEALAND.
THEN IT SAYS LATER THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE ENTITLED, IN THE EVENT THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT MOVE OUTSIDE THE
STATE OF UTAH, THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE ENTITLED TO FOUR
WEEKS OF VISITATION DURING THE SUMMER FOR THE PURPOSE OF
EXERCISING VACATION.
AND THEN IT SAYS THE PARTIES SHALL FREELY AND
OPENLY COMMUNICATE REGARDING ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN.

THERE SHALL BE RESERVED IN

THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE AND REVIEW THE SCHOOLING
AND ACADEMIC RECORDS OF THE CHILDREN, ALL MEDICAL AND
DENTAL RECORDS AND ALL SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS RECORDS OF
IMPORTANCE.

IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE DUPLICATE RECORDS ARE

NOT PROVIDED BY THE CHILDRENS« SCHOOL OR MEDICALS PROVIDED
THE PLAINTIFF WILL FORWARD COPIES OF THOSE RECORDS TO THE
DEFENDANT, SUCH AS THE CHILDRENS' REPORT CARDS, PARENT/

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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TEACHER NOTICES.

THE DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT OF

ACCESS TO SCHOOL AND MEDICAL RECORDS AND SO ON.
WELL, IN THIS CASE THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT CONTINUED TO ESTABLISH A HEALTHY PARENTAL
RELATIONSHIP IN THE DEFENDANT, AND BY DOING THAT HAS CREATED SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO THE DEFENDANT EXERCISING HIS
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF VISITATION.
LET ME GO THROUGH EACH ISSUE IN THE ORDER WHICH
THEY WERE ARGUED.
FIRST IN RELATION TO THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY.

THE

COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND MR. VIC HAYNES ENTERED
INTO A COHABITATION RELATIONSHIP AS OF THE END OF FEBRUARY,
1993.

THAT THEY, IN EFFECT, RESIDED TOGETHER THEREAFTER,

EVEN THOUGH FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME THEY HAD SEPARATE
CONDOMINIUMS, THEY MAINTAINED AN ON-GOING SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP AS CANDIDLY ACKNOWLEDGED, THEY SHARED EXPENSES, THEY
SHARED OPEN ACCESS TO EACH OTHER'S PROPERTY, TO EACH
OTHER'S CONDOMINIUM AND LIVED AS THOUGH THEY MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.

THEY SPENT TIME AT EACH

OTHER'S CONDOMINIUMS, PRINCIPALLY AT HERS, HE CARRIED A KEY
TO IT OR HAD ACCESS ALWAYS BY THE HIDDEN KEY.

THEY ATE

MEALS TOGETHER, THEY SHARED EXPENSES WITH FOOD, HE PARKED
HIS CAR THERE ON OCCASION BUT HE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO OTHERWISE WALK THERE FROM HIS OWN CONDOMINIUM.

SO THERE WILL BE

NO ALIMONY DUE AFTER THE END OF FEBRUARY, 1993.

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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AS TO THE UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES THE DIVORCE
DECREE REQUIRES MR. SIGG TO MAINTAIN THE MEDICAL INSURANCE
WITH A $250.00 DEDUCTIBLE.

THAT'S WHAT THEY AGREED TO.

ALL RIGHT NOW, THAT WAS THE DECREE.

CERTAINLY, IF HE

WISHES, HE CAN HAVE A $1,000.00 DEDUCTIBLE TO MAKE THE
DIFFERENCE OR THE PREMIUM REDUCED BY A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT,
AND HE SHALL PAY THE FIRST $750.00 SO THAT HE, IN ESSENCE,
IS PAYING THE DEDUCTIBLE.

ALL RIGHT?

AND THEREAFTER THEY

SHALL BEAR ALL UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES EQUALLY.
NOW IF SHE CAN GET MEDICAL INSURANCE THROUGH HER
EMPLOYMENT AT A BETTER OR REDUCED RATE SHE SHOULD DO THAT
AND THE—IF IT IS AT NO EXPENSE SHE SHOULD DO THAT AND SAVE
THE EXPENSE TO HIM.
COVERAGE.

HE SHOULD THEN INSURE THE EXCESS

ALL RIGHT?
THE COURT FINDS AS TO THE DAY CARE COSTS THAT THE

DAY CARE COSTS WERE NOT ALL INCURRED AS A LEGITIMATE COST
OF DAY CARE FOR CARING FOR THE CHILDREN WHILE THE MOTHER
WAS OTHERWISE WORKING, THAT MANY OF THE DECISIONS IN RELATION TO THE DAY CARE COSTS WERE REALLY NOT NECESSARY EVEN
THOUGH I RECOGNIZE THAT SHE COULD NOT WORK AS FULLY OUT OF
A HOME WITH THE CHILD PRESENT AS SHE MIGHT BE ENGAGED WITHOUT THE CHILD BEING PRESENT.

NOW I HAVE NO GREAT BASIS TO

DETERMINE UPON WHICH, HOW MUCH OF THIS SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED, AND SO I'M GOING TO MAKE A DECISION THAT ONETHIRD OF THE AMOUNT IS TO BE THE MOTHER'S COSTS SOLELY, AND

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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THE PARTIES ARE TO DIVIDE THE REMAINDER.

NOW, OF COURSE,

I'M EXCLUDING FROM THAT THE MARGARET BRAAE COST WHICH I
THINK WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO BE REQUESTED AND WAS DELETED BY
THE PLAINTIFF IN HER OWN TESTIMONY.

ALL RIGHT?

NOW AS TO THE FEES AND EXPENSES THAT HAVE BEEN
INCURRED.

THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT, MR. SIGG,

WAS PLACED IN AN EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT POSITION TO
ASSERT HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS OF VISITATION AND THAT HE SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN SO PLACED AND THAT THE MOTHER—THAT THAT
CONDUCT WAS SO EXTREME IN THIS CASE THAT IT JUSTIFIES
HAVING THE PLAINTIFF, MRS. SIGG, BEAR SOME OF HIS EXPENSES.
ON EXHIBIT, DEFENDANT'S 2, THE COURT FINDS THAT ITEMS ONE
AND TWO SHALL BE BORNE EXCLUSIVELY BY MR. SIGG AND ITEMS
THREE AND FOUR SHALL BE BORNE EXCLUSIVELY BY MRS. SIGG.
THAT IS, SHE SHALL PAY THE BOULDER CRIMINAL COSTS AND
EXPENSES INCURRED OVER THERE, SHE SHALL PAY FOR THE PETITION TO MODIFY, THE ATTORNEY'S FEES OF MR. SESSIONS, WHICH
IS THE AMOUNT OF $9,302.48.
NOW, MR. SESSIONS, I NOTE THAT SAYS THROUGH MAY
31ST.

THERE MAY BE SOME ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS.

I WILL ALLOW

YOU TO SUBMIT TO ME AN AFFIDAVIT IN THAT REGARD AND I WILL
DETERMINE WHETHER ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS SHOULD BE ADDED TO
THAT.
MR. SESSIONS:
JUDGE YOUNG:

WE WILL DO THAT.
ALL RIGHT.

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

THE WHOLE OF THE COST
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OF ELIZABETH STEWART'S EXPENSE OF $2,900.00 PLUS HER TESTIMONY SHALL BE BORNE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE.
OTHER THAN THOSE FEES EACH SHALL BEAR THEIR OWN
COSTS IN ADDITION THERETO.
NOW AS TO THIS ISSUE OF CUSTODY.

OBVIOUSLY THIS

IS THE MOST BURDENSOME ISSUE THAT A COURT DEALS WITH IN A
CASE LIKE THIS AND IT IS PATHETIC THAT IT HAD TO COME BACK
TO ME UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

AS A MATTER OF FACT,

WHATEVER I DECIDE, LIKE I SAID EARLIER, IS GOING TO HAVE TO
BE APPLIED HEREAFTER.
HEREAFTER.

IT DOESN'T START HERE BEFORE.

IT'S

THERE HAS TO BE A COMPLETE CHANGE OF HEART IN

THE WAY THAT YOU EACH DEAL WITH EACH OTHER.
MR. HAYNES IS TO BE EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED, MS. SIGG,
FROM ANY INVOLVEMENT WHATSOEVER.

HE COULD BE ACCUSED OF

CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE SHOULD HE CONVERSE IN ANY RESPECT OR
INTERFERE IN ANY RESPECT.
OF THAT BY YOU.

AND SO HE SHOULD BE SO ADVISED

THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT HE CAN'T ACCEPT A

TELEPHONE CALL AND BE COURTEOUS, THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT HE
CAN'T REFER CALLS TO THE CHILDREN, AS HE SHOULD.
THE CHILDREN SHOULD HEREAFTER HAVE COMPLETE AND
OPEN ACCESS TO BOTH PARENTS BY TELEPHONE.

ALL PRIVATE

NUMBERS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CHILDREN AND TO THE OTHER
PARTY.

ANY NUMBERS IN YOUR RESPECTIVE RESIDENCES SHOULD

ALWAYS BE KNOWN BY THE OTHER PARTY.
NOW EACH OF YOU IS EXPECTED TO ONLY MAKE

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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EMERGENCY CALLS AT UNUSUAL HOURS.

IF THE CHILDREN ARE

INJURED OR SOMETHING AND YOU HAVE TO MAKE A CALL AT 1:00
O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING YOU MAKE IT AT 1:00 O'CLOCK IN THE
MORNING.

BUT THAT IS ONLY AN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCE; IT'S

NOT A NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCE.

CALLS SHOULD BE MADE AT NORMAL

TIMES.
COURT FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO THE VISITATION.

THE COURT HAS

REVIEWED THE FINDINGS OF DR. STEWART AND HER RECOMMENDATIONS AND SPECIFICALLY ADOPTS THE FINDINGS IN RELATION TO
THE LEGAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED, ONE THROUGH FIVE THAT
ARE WRITTEN ON PAGES THREE AND FOUR OF HER REPORT, AND
ADOPTS REALLY ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT SHE HAS MADE
AS THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THAT RECOMMENDATION IS WELLFOUNDED IN FACT, THAT THERE HAS BEEN A FLAGRANT DISREGARD
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE FATHER BY THE MOTHER IN THIS CASE AND
A DESIRE TO NOT BE FLEXIBLE AS SHE TESTIFIED, TO NOT BE
COOPERATIVE AS SHE TESTIFIED, TO NOT BE SUPPORTIVE AS SHE
TESTIFIED.

SHE SADLY MISSED THE MARK IN THAT REGARD.

AS A RESULT OF THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
CHILDREN SHOULD BE CHANGED IN THEIR CUSTODY FROM THE MOTHER
TO THE FATHER AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE VISITATION THAT
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY GRANTED BY THE FATHER TO THE MOTHER
WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A SIGNIFICANT SUMMER VISITATION WITH

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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THE MOTHER THIS SUMMER, THAT THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE ENROLLED IN THE PARK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT DURING THE NEXT
ACADEMIC YEAR RESIDING WITH THE FATHER.
AND I'M GOING TO TELL YOU THAT I REALLY BELIEVE
THAT BOTH OF YOU BETTER PUT BEHIND YOU THE BITTERNESS AND
THE HOSTILITY AND BE WILLING HEREAFTER TO RECOGNIZE THAT IF
THE CHILDREN SHOULD LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER NEXT YEAR OR
EVEN DURING THE YEAR, MR. SIGG, DON'T INVEST YOUR EMOTION
TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE CHILDREN.
AS IT OUGHT TO.

LET THE CHANGE OCCUR

CHILDREN CAN AND OUGHT TO AND USUALLY DO

LIVE WITH OTHER PARENTS DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR YOUTH
WHEN THERE IS A DIVORCE. THERE IS NO REASON TO THINK THAT
THEY SHOULDN'T LIVE WITH THEIR FATHER FOR A SIGNIFICANT
PERIOD OF TIME AND WITH THEIR MOTHER FOR A SIGNIFICANT
PERIOD OF TIME HEREAFTER.

BUT I EXPECT YOU TO WORK IT OUT.

THE VISITATION SCHEDULE INCORPORATED BY THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THIS DISTRICT SHALL BE ADOPTED AS THE
VISITATION SCHEDULE, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT A SPECIFIC
VISITATION SCHEDULE IS NECESSARY.

I THINK YOU OUGHT TO

VIEW THAT AS A MINIMUM AND YOU OUGHT TO BE PURSUING MUCH
GREATER ACCESS TO BOTH PARENTS.
NOW I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW SAD I FEEL THAT THIS
THING HAS HAD TO BE BROUGHT TO ME, BECAUSE FOR ME TO HAVE
TO MAKE THIS DECISION RATHER THAN FOR YOU TO HAVE TO MAKE
THIS DECISION SHOWS A SIGNIFICANT IMMATURITY AND A SAD

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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SITUATION FOR THESE TWO GIRLS WHO, I'M HEARTENED TO NOTE,
HAVE BEEN VERY, VERY SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL
MENTAL ATTITUDES, SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, ADJUSTMENTS.
NOW, MR. SESSIONS, I AM GOING TO ASK YOU TO
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT.

IS THERE ANYTHING LEFT THAT

NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED OR RESOLVED?
MR. SESSIONS:

I KNOW OF NOTHING, YOUR HONOR.

JUDGE YOUNG:

MS. MAYCOCK?

MS. MAYCOCK:

I CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING, YOUR

JUDGE YOUNG:

THANK YOU EACH.

HONOR.

MR. SESSIONS:
MS. MAYCOCK:

COURT'S IN RECESS.

THANK YOU.
THANK YOU.

(WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED).

* * *
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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH

)
•
•

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

SS.

I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME.

~ EILEEtf'M. AMBROSE", C.S.R.

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

I

~-~

^ll'2lJSL ~ l'.\-~!

JANUARY 14TH, 1996
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